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1 Introduction
In Tanzania, average consumption per-capita is in the range of $1 per day. At such low
levels, the marginal value of additional consumption is very high. For this reason, we ex-
pect households in Tanzania and in other low-income countries to be especially mindful of
opportunities to raise consumption through careful management of purchasing behavior.
In this paper we study the surprising, contrary finding that many households purchase
non-perishable goods in small increments, multiple times, over a two-week period. If price
schedules were linear and transaction costs minimal, frequent purchasing in small increments
would have no impact on the budget set. We show, however, that many goods exhibit
bulk discounts over commonly realized values of the quantity support. As a result, many
households suffer significant financial losses (or, equivalently, substantial reductions in their
consumption) in order to maintain a pattern of frequent, small-quantity purchases.
We have two main goals in the paper. First, we carefully document the existence
of bulk discounts in markets in Tanzania, and quantify the financial losses that households
incur (or the quantity of consumption forgone) by not taking advantage of these bulk dis-
counts. Second, we empirically investigate why households do not take advantage of bulk
discounts. Here, we focus on both traditional explanations—such as liquidity constraints,
or fear of social taxation—and more behavioral explanations—such as inattention, or self-
control problems.
In Section 2, we motivate our analysis with a simple example that illustrates how
making frequent purchases in small quantities is financially inefficient when there are bulk
discounts. We further use this example to delineate a variety of explanations for why a
household might still choose to make frequent small-quantity purchases, despite incurring
these losses. That discussion previews the possible explanations that we formally investigate
later in the paper. We then develop our empirical framework. In particular, we describe how
we use observed purchases at focal quantities—frequently observed quantities—to estimate
a market expenditure schedule, e∗i (q), for every item i. This schedule returns the amount
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one must spend to purchase quantity q of item i in a single transaction. The financial cost
of small-quantity purchasing comes from comparing observed expenditure over two weeks
to the estimated cost of purchasing the total observed quantity all in one purchase (using
e∗i (q)). In making these calculations, we project each observed transaction onto the market
expenditure schedule, to ensure that the measure of financial losses is driven entirely by a
failure to take advantage of bulk discounts, not by whether a particular transaction is a good
or bad deal conditional on the quantity purchased.
We describe our data set in Section 3. The data come from the Survey of House-
hold Welfare and Labour in Tanzania (SHWALITA), a consumption survey conducted in
2007-2008. We use a subset of the SHWALITA data, consisting of transaction diaries main-
tained by 1,499 households from 168 villages in 7 districts. For 2 weeks, these households
recorded every purchase, gift, sale, or change in stocks, for all goods. We focus on the nearly
57,000 recorded purchases of 22 non-perishable items. We use the text description of each
transaction to ensure that the item definitions are highly standardized. The set of items
in the study includes numerous staple goods, such as kerosene, cooking oil, maize, flour,
cassava, beans, rice, onions, cooking bananas, and dried sardines. Frequent purchasing is
commonplace—among households that purchase an item, the average number of purchase
transactions is 3.6 over two weeks.
In Section 4, we turn to our first main goal: carefully documenting the existence of
bulk discounts, and quantifying the financial losses (or forgone consumption) from not taking
advantage of these bulk discounts. Using focal quantities and prices to estimate e∗i (q) at the
district level, we find that bulk discounts exist for 82 of the 146 item-district pairs. Some
items exhibit bulk discounts in all seven districts, others in a subset of the districts. One
item, brewed tea, does not exhibit bulk discounts in any district.1
1There is a longstanding literature on the estimation of demand elasticities for consumer goods in develop-
ing countries (Deaton, 1988; Subramanian and Deaton, 1996; Deaton, Friedman and Alatas, 2004; McKelvey,
2011). That literature focuses on the problem of using unit values from aggregate data to proxy for prices,
because transaction-level data like ours is rarely available. Those papers do not allow for bulk discounts, as
identification usually requires assuming linear prices at the local level.
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We find that households appear to be sacrificing a substantial amount of consumption
by not taking advantage of bulk discounts. Across items purchased multiple times in the
two-week study period, the value of forgone consumption is equal to 8.9% of the value of
expenditure. In other words, the average household could spend nearly 9% less on a range of
important goods without reducing consumption. This average value masks significant het-
erogeneity. Approximately 8% of households have zero forgone consumption, while a quarter
could reduce expenditure by over 10% without reducing quantity purchased. If we take
the alternative approach of holding expenditure constant and calculating the counterfactual
quantities that could be purchased by buying all at once, we find ever larger average values.
Households could purchase 33% more kerosene, 50% more cooking bananas, 26% more cook-
ing oil, 46% more onions, 28% more sardines – surprisingly large amounts for goods that are
part of daily life in Tanzanian villages.
In Section 5, we address our second main goal: investigating why households fail
to take advantage of bulk discounts. Recent papers have shown how seemingly inexplicable
behavior by individuals in developing countries can be understood by either gathering better
information about the setting (Baland, Guirkinger and Mali, 2011; Stephens and Barrett,
2011; Zeitlin, 2011; Burke, 2014), or expanding the class of admissible explanations to include
those grounded in models that allow for psychological biases or cognitive costs (Ashraf,
Karlan and Yin, 2006; Duflo, Kremer and Robinson, 2011; Dupas and Robinson, 2013; Mani
et al., 2013; Kremer et al., 2013; Jack and Smith, 2015; Kremer et al., 2015). We borrow
from both of these approaches, and consider a wide range of both rational and behavioral
mechanisms.
We first focus on explanations that we conclude are not playing a major role in driving
the losses that we estimate. The hypotheses that we reject are the following: binding liquidity
constraints prevent households from buying in bulk; it is costly to store or transport bulk
quantities; consumers are not aware of bulk discounts; people enjoy going to the market
and shopping; and, paying high mark-ups on small quantities of some items is important for
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maintaining buyer-seller relationships. Evidence against these hypotheses comes primarily
from the rejection of necessary conditions, through a combination of parametric and non-
parametric arguments. Our finding that losses are not driven by liquidity constraints is
particularly important relative to the prior literature on this question, which has largely
found that an inability to take advantage of bulk discounts leads the poor to pay more for
consumption (Rao, 2000; Attanasio and Frayne, 2006; Gibson and Kim, 2011; Mussa, 2015;
Attanasio and Pastorino, 2015). In contrast, we find that losses from not buying in bulk
are not concentrated among poorer households. Moreover, it is not the case that poorer
households tend to make purchases in smaller quantities than wealthier households.
Next, we focus on explanations for which we find supportive evidence. First, while we
conclude that households are surely aware of the available bulk discounts, loss-prone house-
holds seem to be inattentive to the financial implications of not buying in bulk. Accounting
for both household and item fixed effects, loss-prone households do not reduce the number of
purchase transactions on items with bulk discounts, whereas other households do. Second,
we find evidence that households make more frequent purchases as a way of rationing their
consumption, perhaps due to worries that they will consume large stocks more quickly than
they would like. Evidence related to rationing is based on the analysis of shopping patterns
for “temptation goods”, which we identified through a separate survey that we conducted
in Tanzania. Third, we find evidence that households might purchase in small quantities in
order to avoid social taxation—in the form of friends, family, and neighbors consuming a
portion of their stocks (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Platteau, 2006; Goldberg, 2016; Baland,
Guirkinger and Mali, 2011; Alby, Auriol and Nguimkeu, 2013; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016). In
fact, because we observe flows of both incoming and outgoing resources, we can construct
a proxy measure of each household’s social tax rate. Finally, we find evidence that losses
are larger in households that seem to have a harder time coordinating their purchases, as
proxied by the number of times that two members of the same household purchase the same
item on the same day. This finding suggests that each household member makes purchases
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in small quantities as a kind of hedge against the possibility that another household member
is purchasing the same item.
Finally, in Section 6, we discuss some broader implications of our analysis. We high-
light the that household purchasing behavior seems driven by multiple mechanisms. More-
over, these mechanisms might interact with each other in important ways, and operate
differently across different households. We also discuss possible policy implications.
2 Conceptual framework
In this section, we develop a conceptual framework that underlies our empirical analysis.
We begin with a stylized, motivating example of bulk discounts. We then build upon this
example to introduce our approach to the data.
2.1 Motivating example
Suppose that, in a particular district of Tanzania, rice is sold in three quantities: 1 kg for
1000 TZS; 2 kg for 1600 TZS; and 4 kg for 2400 TZS. Note the existence of bulk discounts:
the unit (per-kg) price is 1000 TZS for the 1 kg purchase, 800 TZS for 2 kg, and 600 TZS
for 4 kg.
A household that wishes to consume 4 kg of rice over a two-week period has (at least)
three options: it could purchase a 4 kg bag and consume it over the two weeks; it could
purchase a 2 kg bag, consume it over the first week, then purchase another 2 kg bag at the
start of the second week; or it could purchase a 1 kg bag four times over the course of the two
weeks. From a purely financial perspective, purchasing the 4 kg in a single transaction—
buying in bulk—is most efficient. Yet, we will see that many households do not always
purchase in bulk.
Suppose we observe a household that purchases a 1 kg bag on four occasions over
the two weeks. This raises two questions. First, how large are the losses incurred from not
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buying in bulk? Second, why might this household be willing to incur the loss?
In our stylized example, the answer to the first question is straightforward. We can
calculate a financial loss by taking what the household actually paid for the 4 kg of rice
(4000 TZS) and subtracting what the household could have paid had it purchased the entire
4 kg in bulk (2400 TZS). Hence, this household incurred a financial loss of 1600 TZS for
rice. Alternatively, we can calculate a quantity loss by taking the total amount spent (4000
TZS), calculating the quantity that could have been purchased had that entire amount been
spent at the lowest per-unit price (62
3
kg at 600 TZS per kg), and subtracting the quantity
the household actually purchased (4 kg). Hence, this household incurred a quantity loss of
22
3
kg. With some minor adjustments, this is the approach that we take in the data (see the
next subsection for details).
Turning to the second question, there are a number of reasons a household might
choose not to buy in bulk despite the financial cost entailed. To foreshadow our analysis in
Section 5, here we provide a brief overview of the hypotheses we will consider. These hy-
potheses arose from three sources: discussions with individuals and focus groups in Tanzania
(described in Section 3), our own hypothesizing based on the literature or our knowledge of
the context, and suggestions from colleagues or seminar participants.
The first set of possible factors relates to the full cost of getting goods from the
market to the house. A natural concern in Tanzania is that the household may be liquidity
constrained. If household members are living on day-to-day wage earnings, have minimal
savings, and must satisfy a range of consumption needs, they may not be able to spend
2400 TZS on rice in a single purchase. This theme is prominent in existing work on bulk
discounts. Another possibility is that there are other costs associated with bulk purchasing,
e.g. transport costs, storage costs, or expected losses to depreciation. A full accounting of
such costs might show that the bulk purchase is not optimal.
A second set of factors revolves around the way that goods are consumed. Prior
evidence suggests that in sub-Saharan Africa, wealth is subject to a high rate of “social
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taxation” in the form of friends and relatives asking for handouts or coming over for meals.
Pressure to distribute resources among social networks may be particularly significant for
visible goods such stores of staple items. In our example, if the household buys in bulk,
friends and relatives may notice the large bag of rice and be more inclined to ask for a loan
or to eat a meal at the house. Relatedly, a household might be worried about self-control
problems among its members. If having 4 kg of rice makes household members more prone
to consume a little extra rice on any given day, the household could end up consuming its
rice store more quickly than planned.
A final set of possible factors relates to how people shop. Markets are gathering places
and centers of social life. There could be utility value from visiting the market frequently,
and making regular purchases may be a part of the implicit social contract. Or, it may be
the case that bulk discounts are a function of the relationships between buyers and sellers,
so that discounts are only available to those who make regular purchases from across the
quantity distribution. Additionally, it may be costly to coordinate purchases within the
household. For instance, if a person is at the market and considers buying some rice, she
may wonder whether someone else from the household has already purchased rice. To avoid
both a shortage and an excess of rice at home, it might be natural to purchase only 1 or 2
kg. Finally, it may be the case that when making purchases, shoppers are simply inattentive
to the magnitude of forgone consumption from purchasing in small quantities.
2.2 Framework for empirical analysis
In order to quantify the losses from not buying in bulk, we generalize the approach in our
stylized example to reflect nuances in the data. We again begin with a set of focal quantities:
suppose an item i is available in the market in R focal quantities {qr}Rr=1, ordered so that
q1 < q2 < ... < qR. Let er denote the expenditure required to purchase quantity qr, and
let pr denote the associated unit price, so pr = er/qr. Suppose the focal quantities (weakly)
exhibit bulk discounts, so that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ... ≥ pR. A focal quantity should be interpreted as
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roughly a package size or a common unit of trade, analogous to the three quantities in our
rice example. In some cases these focal quantities correspond to actual package sizes from
mass produced items, such as 1 liter bottles of cooking oil. In other cases, local units have
emerged over time as vendors adopt widely available buckets or canisters as standard units
of trade.
Our approach will be to identify focal quantities empirically, using commonly observed
transaction quantities. In the following section we will be precise about how we do this, and
about how we estimate focal prices. For the moment, take it as given that we observe {qr}Rr=1
and {pr}Rr=1 for each item.
Over the two weeks during which it is observed, suppose that household h buys item
i in K separate transactions. Let k = 1, . . . , K index the household’s purchases, with the
associated quantities and expenditures denoted qhik and ehik, respectively. Household h’s
observed total expenditure on item i is ehi ≡
∑K
k=1 ehik, and its observed total quantity of
item i is qhi ≡
∑K
k=1 qhik. As in our motivating example, our goal is to calculate (i) the
financial savings if household h had instead purchased its entire observed total quantity in
a single transaction, and (ii) the extra quantity if household h had instead spent its entire
observed total expenditure in a single transaction. Before we can do so, however, we must
address some issues that arise in the data.
First, these calculations require knowing the expenditure associated with any quan-
tity, not just focal quantities. To reflect the reality of shopping in these markets, we base
such estimates on the expenditure required to purchase a particular quantity using only focal
quantities. Specifically, we define the expenditure schedule, e∗i (q), as follows. For any focal
quantity qr, we assign e
∗
i (qr) ≡ er. For any quantity that is between two focal quantities, we
use the weighted average of the expenditures for the closest focal quantities on either side:
for any q ∈ [qr, qr+1], e∗i (q) ≡
(
qr+1 − q
qr+1 − qr
)
er +
(
q − qr
qr+1 − qr
)
er+1.
Finally, we assign the lowest unit price (pR) to any quantity greater than the largest focal
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quantity (i.e., e∗i (q) ≡ qpR for any q > qR), and the highest unit price (p1) to any quantity
less than the smallest focal quantity (i.e., e∗i (q) ≡ qp1 for any q < q1). Note that this
expenditure schedule can be converted into a unit price schedule using p∗i (q) = e
∗
i (q)/q.
There are two interpretations of this weighted average approach. The first relates to
actual behavior in the market. Consider a shopper in our motivating example trying to buy
3 kg of rice in a single transaction. The buyer may argue that she should pay at most the 2
kg unit price, and perhaps an even lower unit price, given how much rice she is buying. If the
probability of receiving a particular unit price is proportional to the difference between the
quantity being purchased and the nearest focal quantities, our measure assigns the expected
value. A second interpretation relates to our choice of an aggregation period of two weeks,
which is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. In most cases, qhi, the aggregate quantity purchased
over two weeks, will not correspond to an exact focal quantity. But we could just as easily
aggregate purchases over a longer or shorter time period to ensure that qhi is equal to a focal
quantity. We are effectively calculating the expenditure associated with aggregating to the
next lower or next higher focal quantity, and then taking a weighted average.
A second issue is that while the majority of observed transactions take place at focal
quantities, some do not. Moreover, some transactions at focal quantities are not at focal
prices. To deal with idiosyncratic variation in quantities and unit prices, we project all
observed transactions onto the expenditure schedule prior to aggregation. Hence, observed
expenditure by household h on item i in transaction k can be represented as ehik = e
∗
i (qhik)+
νhik, where νhik is an idiosyncratic component. Then, household h’s adjusted expenditure on
item i in transaction k is eˆhik ≡ e∗i (qhik), and its adjusted total expenditure on item i is
eˆhi ≡
∑K
k=1 eˆhik. Using adjusted total expenditures in our calculations of losses will ensure
that our results are not distorted when a household’s actual expenditure in a particular
transaction happens to be above or below the expenditure schedule.
Although we will show that bulk discounts are clearly identifiable within-village and
even within-household, for power reasons we will construct e∗i (q) at the district level. Yet,
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households within a district might face slightly different prices due to variation in bargaining
power, between-village price variation, and residual variation in unobserved quality (in Sec-
tion 3 we explain how we reduce the possibility of unobserved quality variation). However,
because we use adjusted rather than observed expenditures, we do not need to assume that
every household in a district faces exactly the same schedule. Instead, the identifying as-
sumption is that any differences in expenditure schedules take the form of parallel shifts over
the relevant ranges. This will not be especially restrictive, because the ranges of quantities
under consideration here are infra-marginal to wholesale volumes, so that the transport cost
component of any between-village price variation does not vary across focal points.
With this framework, we can calculate the financial savings to household h if it had
purchased its entire observed total quantity over the two weeks in a single transaction.
Specifically, household h’s financial loss on item i is Lhi ≡ eˆhi− e∗i (qhi) =
(∑K
k=1 e
∗
i (qhik)
)
−
e∗i (qhi), and its percentage financial loss is L˜hi ≡ Lhi/eˆhi. By construction, Lhi and L˜hi are
zero for any item that the household purchases only once over the two weeks. This makes our
approach conservative, because the items we study are popular consumer goods in Tanzania
and in many cases they can be stored for months. Households that purchase item i only
once over the study period, in small quantity, could in all likelihood reduce expenditure by
bulk purchasing for a longer time period.
Alternatively, we can also calculate the extra quantity that household h could pur-
chase if it spent its total adjusted expenditure in a single transaction. Specifically, inverting
the expenditure schedule, household i’s quantity loss on item i is Qhi ≡ e∗−1i (eˆhi)− qhi, and
its percentage quantity loss is Q˜hi ≡ Qhi/qhi. Again, by construction, Qhi and Q˜hi are zero
for any item that a household purchases only once over the two weeks. For much of the
analysis, we will focus on the financial loss measures, Lhi and L˜hi, because they can easily
be aggregated across items (we will typically refer to these as “loss” and “percentage loss”).
However, the quantity loss measures provide an additional way to understand the magnitude
of the purchasing inefficiencies in the data.
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Figure I: Expenditure and unit price for the example with 3 focal points
Notes: Authors’ calculations from example data in text.
Figure I gives an example our approach. Imagine a household that buys rice in
the market described in Section 2.1. The household reports three rice purchases over the
observation period: 1 kg for 1000 TZS, 1 kg for 1250 TZS, and 1.5 kg for 1500 TZS. The
× in Figure I mark the actual transactions, with the unit price schedule in the left panel
and the expenditure schedule in the right panel. Observed expenditure is 3750 TZS (point
A). Adjusted expenditure is e∗(1) + e∗(1) + e∗(1.5) = 1000 + 1000 + 1300 = 3300 (point
B). Counterfactual expenditure from bulk purchasing is e∗(3.5) = 2200 (point C). These
three expenditure values are associated with the total observed quantity of 3.5 kg. Finally,
the counterfactual quantity that could be purchased using the total adjusted expenditure of
3300 all at once is e∗−1i (3300) = 3300/600 = 5.5 kg (point D). For this example, the financial
measures of loss are Lhi = 3300− 2200 = 1100 (the vertical distance between points B and
C), and L˜hi = 1100/3300 = 33.3%. The quantity measures of loss are Qhi = 5.5− 3.5 = 2 kg
(the horizontal distance between points B and D), and Q˜hi = 2/3.5 = 57.1%. This household
could reduce its expenditure on rice by 33.3% without reducing its quantity consumed, or it
could increase its quantity of rice consumed by 57.1% without increasing its expenditure.
12
3 Data and descriptive patterns
The data for this paper are from the Survey of Household Welfare and Labour in Tanzania
(SHWALITA). The survey was part of an experiment to test the impact of questionnaire
design on consumption measures (see Beegle et al. (2012) for details). In one arm of the
study, 9 households per village were randomly assigned to complete a consumption diary in
one of three conditions. Three households completed a single, household-level diary, with
no monitoring by project staff. Three households also completed a single, household-level
diary, but received multiple follow-up visits from an enumerator or local assistant. Lastly,
in the final three households, each adult member kept his or her own diary, with children
placed on the diaries of the adults who knew most about their daily activities. Households in
the third group received multiple follow-up visits, similar to those in the second group. The
differences between module arms are small but non-negligible, and they have no impact on
the findings in this paper. We control for the diary module type in all relevant regressions.
The SHWALITA survey was conducted in 24 villages per district, in 7 districts. The
resulting data set includes responses for 1,512 diary households. We dropped 10 households
that did not purchase any of the items that we study, and 3 that did not complete the
end-line survey, leaving a sample size of 1,499. Data were collected from September 2007
to August 2008. All households in a given village completed their diaries over the same 14
days. Survey work in each district was completed in less than two months.2
Each day during the study period, diary keepers recorded the quantity, unit, value,
and description of all items that came into or went out of the household. Respondents
separately listed purchases, gifts, own production, and stock adjustments. We use only the
purchasing data, except where otherwise specified. After the diary period, project staff
assigned each listed item to one of 73 categories, covering 58 food items and 15 non-food
items. For this paper we drop items with too few observations, and drop perishable items
2More details are available at the project page, accessible here: http://edi-global.com/publications/.
Data are available by contacting the lead SHWALITA researchers listed on the project page.
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that cannot be stored for two weeks by most households (such as beef, milk, and fresh
fish). We include one service – milling of staple grains – which is frequently purchased.
Importantly, we do not drop or retain items based on whether the price schedule exhibits
bulk discounts. This improves the generalizability of our findings, and is useful for some of
the tests implemented in Section 5.
To minimize quality variation within items, we use the detailed transaction descrip-
tions to standardize items. For example, we drop “unrefined sugar” from “Sugar”, retain
only “dried beans” from the original category of “Peas, beans, lentils and other pulses”, keep
only “immature coconuts” in the “Coconut” category, and restrict the “Dried fish” group
to only “dried sardines”, excluding larger fish. In this way we create 22 items that are far
more uniform than the goods in a typical consumption survey. Table I shows details.
A further cleaning step was required to standardize units. Respondents reported
quantities in kilograms, liters, and a range of local units such as bunches, heaps, tins, ladles,
buckets or bundles. Field team members conducted a market price survey in each village
in conjunction with the household survey, and made a point of precisely measuring local
units at the market. Staff members recorded the most common units in which each item
was sold, measured the unit in kilograms or liters, and noted the price. This was done for
three vendors per market, and at multiple markets if there was more than one major market
in a village. If a diary item was not sufficiently covered by the market price survey, the
survey team purchased and weighed the item in question. We use the median, district-level
conversion rates from these surveys to convert local units into kilograms or liters.
The final data set contains details for 56,892 separate transactions. From the purchase
quantity statistics in Table I we see that maize and cooking bananas, staple carbohydrates,
are the items purchased in the largest kilogram quantities. Comparing the average transac-
tion quantities to the average total 2-week purchase quantities, it is clear that the average
household buys the items it consumes multiple times over two weeks.
Table II shows the pattern of purchases and expenditures, across households, over the
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Table I: Descriptions of item standardization and units
Description of item
Avg.
transaction
quantity
Avg. total
2 week
quantity Unit
Maize: loose, dried maize kernels. Excludes maize flour, maize cobs,
popcorn, or processed maize grains.
10.36 20.90 Kg
Milling: fee paid for machine-grinding. Mostly maize, but milling of
millet, sorghum and rice is not excluded.Husking rice is excluded.
8.60 20.57 Kg
Cooking Bananas: excludes any other type of banana such as roast-
ing bananas, beer bananas or sweet bananas.
7.63 17.32 Kg
Cassava: fresh, raw cassava. Excludes cassava flour and dried, boiled,
fried, or roasted cassava.
3.18 7.52 Kg
Soap: solid bar soap. Excludes powdered soap, beauty soap, dishwash-
ing liquid.
2.21 6.56 Kg
Charcoal: excludes wood, kerosene, other fuels for cooking. 2.06 13.05 Kg
Rice: husked white rice. Excludes unhusked, brown, broken rice. 1.63 5.86 Kg
Flour: white maize flour. Excludes brown flour, flours from wheat,
millet, sorghum.
1.27 7.19 Kg
Beans: dried kidney beans. Excludes fresh kidney beans, green beans,
other beans, green gram, lentils, chick peas, cow peas, pigeon peas,
bambarra nuts, garden peas.
0.85 2.19 Kg
Coconut: whole matured coconuts. Excludes immature coconuts. 0.76 3.88 Kg
Tomatoes: fresh, whole tomatoes. Excludes cherry tomatoes and
canned tomatoes.
0.57 2.85 Kg
Sugar: refined sugar. Excludes unrefined sugar, honey, syrup, other
sweeteners.
0.54 2.22 Kg
Salt: excludes coarse salt or any other spices. 0.52 1.06 Kg
Sweet Bananas: excludes cooking, roasting or beer bananas. 0.42 0.97 Kg
Sardines dried dagaa. Excludes fresh dagaa and other fish. 0.36 1.22 Kg
Onions: fresh, whole onions. 0.30 1.15 Kg
Tea Leaves: black tea leaves. Excludes other types of tea, ground
coffee, instant coffee and other raw ingredients for hot beverages.
0.02 0.08 Kg
Tea: black tea with milk, ready to drink. Exclude other types of tea,
coffee, cocoa, and any other hot beverage.
0.75 3.32 Liter
Kerosene: very homogenous so no need to exclude anything in this
category. Typically used for lighting and/or cooking.
0.26 0.95 Liter
Cooking Oil: liquid vegetable oil. Excludes, butter, ghee, other types
of fat.
0.19 0.84 Liter
Cigarettes: Portsman cigarettes. Excludes other brands, locally made
cigarettes, chewing tobacco, and raw tobacco.
5.10 30.69 Piece
Matches: excludes lighters or wicks. 1.97 4.18 Box
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data.
two-week diary period. The total number of observed transactions ranges from 688 (maize)
to 5472 (tomatoes). The average item was purchased by just under half of the sample (725
households), and was purchased multiple times by just over a third of the sample. Some
items, such as sugar, tomatoes, sardines, onions, cooking oil, and kerosene, were purchased
15
T
ab
le
II
:
P
u
rc
h
as
e
an
d
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
p
at
te
rn
s,
b
y
it
em
,
N
=
14
99
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
s
A
m
on
g
al
l
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
s
A
m
on
g
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
s
p
u
rc
h
as
in
g
it
em
It
em
T
ot
a
l
p
u
rc
h
a
se
s
H
H
s
p
u
r-
ch
as
in
g
H
H
s
m
u
lt
ip
le
p
u
rc
h
as
-
in
g
%
of
H
H
s
m
u
lt
ip
le
p
u
rc
h
as
-
in
g
A
v
g
n
o.
of p
u
rc
h
as
es
A
v
g
to
ta
l
ex
p
en
d
i-
tu
re
%
of
H
H
s
m
u
lt
ip
le
p
u
rc
h
as
-
in
g
A
v
g
n
o.
of p
u
rc
h
as
es
A
v
g
to
ta
l
ex
p
en
d
i-
tu
re
T
om
at
o
es
5
47
2
11
01
89
3
59
.6
3.
7
87
0
81
.1
5.
0
11
84
C
o
ok
in
g
O
il
52
97
11
64
92
5
61
.7
3.
5
14
98
79
.5
4.
6
19
29
K
er
os
en
e
4
55
8
12
71
97
6
65
.1
3.
0
13
05
76
.8
3.
6
15
40
S
u
ga
r
42
93
1
04
4
78
9
52
.6
2.
9
18
32
75
.6
4.
1
26
31
O
n
io
n
s
4
12
7
10
89
79
9
53
.3
2.
8
37
0
73
.4
3.
8
50
9
F
lo
u
r
40
42
7
15
55
6
37
.1
2.
7
20
51
77
.8
5.
7
43
00
S
ar
d
in
es
3
52
3
10
55
79
6
53
.1
2.
4
80
0
75
.5
3.
3
11
36
R
ic
e
33
03
9
19
63
1
42
.1
2.
2
30
70
68
.7
3.
6
50
07
S
oa
p
3
20
2
10
78
74
7
49
.8
2.
1
65
1
69
.3
3.
0
90
6
S
al
t
2
29
9
11
25
68
6
45
.8
1.
5
42
7
61
.0
2.
0
56
9
T
ea
L
ea
ve
s
2
22
7
61
1
39
1
26
.1
1.
5
15
7
64
.0
3.
6
38
5
B
ea
n
s
20
51
79
7
50
1
33
.4
1.
4
11
54
62
.9
2.
6
21
72
M
at
ch
es
19
58
9
22
52
2
34
.8
1.
3
11
9
56
.6
2.
1
19
4
C
o
co
n
u
t
1
90
5
37
3
31
2
20
.8
1.
3
41
6
83
.6
5.
1
16
72
C
h
ar
co
al
17
13
27
0
23
0
15
.3
1.
1
89
2
85
.2
6.
3
49
55
T
ea
1
56
5
35
1
23
6
15
.7
1.
0
16
4
67
.2
4.
5
70
3
M
il
li
n
g
13
56
5
67
30
9
20
.6
0.
9
30
1
54
.5
2.
4
79
6
C
ig
ar
et
te
s
95
7
15
9
11
6
7.
7
0.
6
16
2
73
.0
6.
0
15
32
C
as
sa
va
88
1
37
2
19
2
12
.8
0.
6
24
5
51
.6
2.
4
98
8
S
w
ee
t
B
an
a
n
as
7
49
32
5
14
5
9.
7
0.
5
16
2
44
.6
2.
3
74
9
C
o
ok
in
g
B
an
a
n
as
7
26
32
0
17
3
11
.5
0.
5
50
8
54
.1
2.
3
23
83
M
ai
ze
6
88
34
1
14
3
9.
5
0.
5
16
73
41
.9
2.
0
73
54
A
V
E
R
A
G
E
2
58
6
72
5
50
3
33
.6
1.
7
85
6
67
.2
3.
6
19
82
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
fr
o
m
S
H
W
A
L
IT
A
d
at
a.
16
Table III: Summary statistics at the household level
Mean s.d. Median
Age of head (years) 46.66 16.03 44.00
Education of head (years) 4.73 3.75 7.00
Head is female (=1) 0.20 0.40 0.00
Household size 5.33 2.96 5.00
Share under 15 yrs old 0.42 0.24 0.50
Share over 65 yrs old 0.07 0.19 0.00
Urban area (=1) 0.34 0.48 0.00
Acres owned 3.83 5.56 2.00
Wealth index value -0.01 1.00 -0.43
Nominal consumption (TZS/yr) 2001642 1974544 1449216
Nominal consumption (USD/yr) 1741 1717 1260
Nominal consumption per capita (TZS/yr) 450154 469498 304887
Nominal consumption per capita (USD/yr) 391 408 265
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Sample size is 1,497, because two households
with incomplete demographic data are not included. Tanzania shillings converted to USD at a
rate of 1,150 TZS/USD.
more than once by a majority of households. Among only the households that purchase each
item, the highest average expenditure is on maize at 7,354 TZS/household, and the lowest
is on matches at 194 TZS/household. The average number of purchases per item is 3.6.
In Table III we report household summary statistics. Mean consumption per capita
is almost 400 USD per year, but the distribution is heavily skewed; the median is only 265
USD per year.3 The median household has 5 people. The “Wealth index value” is the value
of the first principal component from a vector of household assets (Filmer and Pritchett,
2001; Sahn and Stifel, 2003). The assets used to construct this wealth index include dwelling
characteristics such as roof material, wall material, and number of rooms, as well as ownership
of durable goods such as phones, other electronics, and bicycles. We use this index as our
primary measure of household wealth because it is not endogenous to concurrent consumer
prices, unlike consumption or expenditure.
While writing this paper we conducted two additional, small-scale data collection
efforts. The first consisted of informal interviews and focus groups with people in Tanzania,
3When applicable, Tanzania shillings (TZS) are converted to US dollars (USD) at the rate of 1,150
TZS/$1, the average exchange rate from the survey period.
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during the years 2012-2015. We interviewed roughly 10 individuals, mostly consumers but
also a few shopkeepers. We conducted three informal focus groups, two in the Kagera re-
gion and one in the Dodoma region, with 5-6 people at each. Through these interviews and
discussions we identified some of the hypotheses for why households might forego bulk dis-
counts, and heard stories about household shopping patterns that helped steer the analysis.
As qualitative work goes, our efforts were decidedly informal. Yet, these conversations were
highly informative. We make one mild empirical claim based on this work (in Section 5.2.3),
and we refer to some of the comments from interviewees when relevant.
Our second data collection effort was an on-line survey conducted in June-July 2016.
This short survey was sent to a group of Tanzanians with extensive experience studying
household decision-making around economic issues. We asked these respondents to charac-
terize items by the likelihood that they are “temptation goods”, i.e., items that one tends
to over-consume (relative to a plan) when held in stock. We describe this survey in more
detail in Section 5.2.2.
4 Quantifying the value of forgone consumption
In this section we estimate the value of consumption that households forego by not buying in
bulk. In Section 4.1 we describe the bulk discounts and the estimated expenditure schedules.
In Section 4.2 we estimate counterfactual expenditures, holding quantity fixed, and counter-
factual quantity, holding expenditure fixed. We also examine the distributions and correlates
of losses. Finally, in Section 4.3 we examine the variation around the expenditure schedule,
to understand why households sometimes pay different prices for the same quantity.
4.1 Bulk discounts in the SHWALITA data
While our main analysis uses the focal price approach described in Section 2.2, it is instructive
to first estimate linear unit price and expenditure schedules. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
18
IV show slope coefficients from a series of item-specific, transaction-level regressions, with
unit price as the dependent variable and quantity as the independent variable, using the
transaction diary data. Each coefficient is from a separate regression. Every estimated slope
coefficient is negative. This holds both within village-day (column 1), where 13 of 22 slope
coefficients are negative and significant, and within household (column 2), where 17 of 22
coefficients are negative and significant. The clear pattern is that unit price is decreasing in
quantity for many items.
In columns 3–4 of Table IV we report the slope coefficients from regressions of unit
price on quantity using the market price survey data. Survey team members collected these
data directly at local markets. The underlying regressions include district (column 3) or
village (column 4) fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the district level. The
market price data do not cover as many items as the diaries, and span a smaller range
of quantities, leading to some level differences between the two sets of slope coefficients.
However, the large majority of coefficients in columns 3 and 4 are negative and statistically
significant. As with the diary data, there are no positive and significant slope coefficients.
An important implication of these estimates is that bulk discounts are not just for regular
customers, but are available to all shoppers, including survey team members who are not
local.4
Having established that bulk discounts exist, we now pursue the non-parametric ap-
proach described in Section 2.2. We designate a quantity as focal if it accounts for at least 5%
of all observations at the item-district level.5 By this definition there are 1-9 focal quantities
4One might be concerned about division bias from constructing unit price as the quotient of two variables
measured with error. To examine this, we estimated expenditure schedules by regressing transaction-level
expenditure on quantity and its square, suppressing the constant and fixed effects to enforce regression
through the origin. The coefficient on q2 is negative and significant for 10 of 22 items, negative and close
to significant for 5 others, and never positive and significant. The implication is that expenditure schedules
are generally concave, which is consistent with bulk discounts. Results in online appendix Table A.1.
5We ignore the roughly 1 in 5 candidate focal quantities that either require greater total expenditure
than a larger-quantity focal point, or that have a higher unit price than a smaller-quantity focal point.
These points can never be part of an optimal counterfactual purchase. Because this also impacts adjusted
expenditure, dropping these points has the effect of substantially attenuating the estimated losses (average
losses are nearly 70% higher if we do not drop these points). This is another way that our approach is
conservative in estimating losses.
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Table IV: Regressions of unit price on quantity, various specifications
Dependent variable: transaction-level unit price
Transaction diary data Market surveys
Item (1) (2) (3) (4)
Rice -4.7* -9.5** -43.3* -26.7
(2.0) (2.6) (19.1) (44.0)
Maize -3.7* -6.1** -1.5*** -1.9
(1.6) (2.4) (0.3) (1.1)
Flour -9.6** -7.8** -171.2 -312.3
(3.2) (3.1) (119.3) (161.3)
Milling -0.9* -0.9**
(0.3) (0.3)
Cassava -3.9 -2.3 -25.6** -221.7***
(9.0) (1.9) (8.6) (20.0)
Cooking Bananas -40.7* -23.4** 1.6 7.5
(16.9) (6.3) (5.5) (7.8)
Sugar -94.5* -78.1** -97.8*** -77.6***
(40.0) (29.6) (14.2) (16.8)
Beans -17.9 -32.9* -212.3* -198.9
(24.0) (15.8) (97.8) (188.1)
Coconut -21.6 -47.5**
(15.3) (9.4)
Tomatoes -83.1 -129.5*
(46.5) (63.0)
Onions -419.0** -396.4***
(119.9) (79.0)
Sweet Bananas -369.6 -210.4* -32.9*** -32.1**
(403.5) (89.3) (8.0) (12.1)
Sardines -371.5** -336.4** -149.1 -272.0
(129.4) (127.4) (208.3) (260.8)
Cooking Oil -1135.8*** -1199.8*** -756.3** -731.2*
(253.3) (239.5) (252.0) (315.6)
Salt -358.9 -267.2
(320.6) (215.6)
Tea -9.6 -8.6
(15.9) (18.5)
Tea Leaves -27319.1** -27338.0**
(7765.7) (8420.1)
Charcoal -17.0** -19.8
(3.9) (9.7)
Kerosene -1378.3** -1206.5***
(425.0) (297.6)
Matches -2.5 -2.7
(2.6) (2.3)
Soap -2.4* -4.7**
(1.2) (1.6)
Cigarettes -0.1 -0.1**
(0.1) (0.0)
Fixed effects Village-day Household District Village
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard
errors clustered at district level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. Controls for
diary type included in regressions underlying columns 1 and 2. Each coefficient is from a separate
regression of unit price on quantity, for only the item indicated.
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per item-district pair, with just over 3.3 on average. Across all items and districts, 70.2% of
purchases were made at a focal quantity. We use the median unit price at the focal quantity
as an estimate of the focal price.
Table V: Example focal quantities and prices from a single district
Focal point cumulative
Item Statistic 1 2 3 4 5 % coverage
Rice Quantity .5 1 1.5 2 3
Frequency (%) 12.3 42.6 10.5 16.4 6 87.8
Median unit price 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Expenditure 500 1000 1500 2000 3000
Sugar Quantity .05 .25 .5 1 .
Frequency (%) 6.2 50.1 17.6 17.2 . 91.1
Median unit price 2000 1000 1000 1000 .
Expenditure 100 250 500 1000 .
Tomatoes Quantity .35 1.05 . . .
Frequency (%) 41.8 6.1 . . . 47.9
Median unit price 571 286 . . .
Expenditure 200 300 . . .
Onions Quantity .05 .1 .35 .7 .
Frequency (%) 30.6 9.1 36.8 11.3 . 87.8
Median unit price 1000 1000 286 286 .
Expenditure 50 100 100 200 .
Sardines Quantity .1083 .2167 .325 . .
Frequency (%) 12.8 17.6 6.6 . . 37.0
Median unit price 1385 923 923 . .
Expenditure 150 200 300 . .
Cooking Oil Quantity .045 .09 .135 .5 .
Frequency (%) 29.1 30.2 5.2 5.1 . 69.6
Median unit price 3333 3333 3333 2200 .
Expenditure 150 300 450 1100 .
Kerosene Quantity .045 .09 .135 1 .
Frequency (%) 32.1 18.7 9.1 9.1 . 69.0
Median unit price 2222 2222 1556 1200 .
Expenditure 100 200 210 1200 .
Soap Quantity 1 2 . . .
Frequency (%) 68.7 20.5 . . . 89.2
Median unit price 150 150 . . .
Expenditure 150 300 . . .
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Focal points are quantities that account for at least
5% of transactions at the district level.
Table V shows descriptive statistics for a set of example price schedules from one of
the study districts. Quantities are in kilogram units for all goods other than cooking oil
and kerosene, which are in liters. Rows show the quantity, percentage of purchases, median
unit price, and expenditure at each focal point. Bulk discounts are visible in the unit price
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data: the minimum unit price becomes available at 0.25 kg of sugar, 0.5 liters of cooking oil,
0.35 kg of onions, and so on. For some of the tests in Section 5 it will be useful to define
q∗min, the minimum quantity that must be purchased in order to reach the lowest available
unit price, and e∗min, the minimum expenditure required to access the lowest available unit
price (i.e., to purchase q∗min). In Table V, q
∗
min (e
∗
min) is equal to 0.5 kg (500 TZS) for rice,
0.25 kg (250 TZS) for sugar, 1.05 kg (300 TZS) for tomatoes, and 0.35 kg (100 TZS) for
onions. Note that in this district, the unit price schedule for rice is flat, so that losses on
rice are zero by construction. The final column shows the percentage of transactions in the
item-district group that are covered by the focal quantities. Coverage rates range from 37%
to 91%; all but two are 69% or greater. Across all items and districts, three quarters of focal
point coverage rates are above 50%.
Because price schedules are estimated at the district level, and the data are from
seven districts, there are up to seven possible values of q∗min and e
∗
min for each item. Table
VI shows the mean, minimum, and maximum values of these two statistics, across the seven
districts. The table also includes the mean quantity purchased over 2 weeks, in column
1, for sake of comparison with q∗min. In columns 3, 4, 6, and 7 we see substantial spatial
variation in the minimum and maximum of q∗min and e
∗
min; what it means to “buy in bulk”
varies across districts. Nonetheless, among households that purchase each item, the mean
quantity purchased (column 1) substantially exceeds the average value of q∗min (column 3).
6
This highlights an important point that we will discuss further in Section 5.1.2: in these
data, the quantities required to buy in bulk are not especially large.
To provide a visual example from the data, Figure II depicts expenditures and unit
prices by quantity for the 686 purchases of kerosene in one of the study districts. The size
of the circles corresponds to the number of transactions at the circle center. The triangles
represent the estimated focal points, and the solid lines mark the unit price (left panel)
6For many items, households would likely have access to even lower bulk discount prices if they were to
buy large, wholesale quantities. Such quantities are not counted as focal by our method, because they are
not represented by 5% or more of all purchase quantities. In this sense we are likely to underestimate the
degree of available bulk discounts.
22
Table VI: Summary statistics across districts for q∗min and e
∗
min, by item
Across the 7 study districts...
Average q∗min e
∗
min
quantity
purchased Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Item (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Maize 20.9 9.38 3 20 2414 750 6498
Kerosene .95 .86 .5 1 1071 600 1300
Cooking Bananas 17.32 10.8 1.72 28 1067 201 1708
Cooking Oil .84 .51 .05 1 850 100 1800
Rice 5.86 1.14 .5 4 771 300 2400
Sugar 2.22 .5 .25 2 629 250 2600
Flour 7.19 1.39 .25 4 617 100 1600
Charcoal 13.05 2.61 1.45 7.25 400 200 700
Beans 2.19 .43 .25 1 400 200 900
Coconut 3.88 .88 .57 1.1 383 200 550
Milling 20.57 9.17 4 20 349 100 700
Cassava 7.52 2.68 .58 8.67 325 50 997
Sweet Bananas .97 1.57 .05 8.61 276 50 550
Salt 1.06 .57 .25 1 264 100 500
Tea Leaves .08 .08 .01 .25 243 50 500
Soap 6.56 2.29 1 8 243 100 704
Sardines 1.22 .27 .14 .5 186 100 300
Tomatoes 2.85 .65 .35 1.4 171 100 300
Matches 4.18 3.57 1 10 133 30 400
Onions 1.15 .51 .05 1.4 114 50 200
Tea 3.32 .5 .5 .5 100 100 100
Cigarettes 30.69 2 1 6 91 50 240
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Column 1 refers to average total purchase over 2 weeks
at the household-item level, for households that purchased positive amounts of the item. Table is sorted by
column 5. Units listed in Table I.
and expenditure (right panel) schedules. In the left side panel, the downward orientation of
the unit prices is clear. In the right side panel, the changing slope of the expenditure line
represents the drop in unit prices as quantity increases. The clustering of purchases at a
small number of quantities is also clear.
We have shown a general pattern of bulk discounts in the data. However, it is
important to note that in each district there are also some items that do not exhibit bulk
discounts. Estimated unit price schedules are flat for 64 of the 146 item-district groups in the
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Figure II: Expenditure and unit price for kerosene purchases in one district
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. We dropped 11 outliers to im-
prove readability of these figures.
data. Some items exhibit bulk discounts in every district. These include maize, cooking oil,
kerosene, cooking bananas, and tea leaves. Unit price schedules for other items, including
sweet bananas, cooking bananas, onions, salt, milling, and sardines, are downward-sloping in
a majority of districts. In contrast, brewed tea never exhibits bulk discounts, while cigarettes,
beans, rice, cassava, and matches each only exhibit discounts in 1 or 2 districts. In Section
5.2.1 we will exploit the fact that households purchase from both flat and downward-sloping
unit price schedules to study the salience of discounts at the time of purchase.7
4.2 The value of forgone consumption
We turn now to our key welfare measures: the quantity and value of forgone consumption
from buying in small quantities. Recall from section 2.2 that the quantity of consumption
forgone is given by Qhi = q
∗
hi − qhi, where the first term is the inverse of the expenditure
function evaluated at total adjusted expenditure e∗hi, and the second term is total observed
quantity. Likewise, the financial loss, or value of forgone consumption, is defined as Lhi =
7Why discounts emerge for some items and not for others, and why they persist despite the appearance
of robust competition in retail markets, are open questions not addressed in this paper. See Attanasio and
Pastorino (2015).
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eˆhi − e∗hi, where eˆhi is total adjusted expenditure and e∗hi is the cost of buying qhi in a single
transaction. Summing across items at the household level gives Lh =
∑
i Lhi.
We begin with the quantity measures. In columns 1–3 of Table VII we report the
item-level means of total observed quantity, qhi, counterfactual quantity, q
∗
hi, and the coun-
terfactual increase in quantity in percentage terms, Q˜hi. Calculations in this table are based
on all households that purchase an item more than once. The results are striking: without
changing total expenditure, households could increase quantity purchased by almost 16% on
average. Potential quantity increases are over 25% for kerosene, onions, cooking bananas,
cooking oil, tea leaves, and sardines. These are staple goods: kerosene is the primary lighting
fuel in much of Tanzania, cooking bananas are a staple carbohydrate (in the two districts
where they are most commonly purchased), sardines are a key source of protein, and cook-
ing oil is the main source of cooking fat. Most households purchase one or more of these
goods: 85% purchase kerosene, 78% purchase cooking oil, 70% purchase sardines, and 21%
purchase cooking bananas (Table II). By choosing to spend eˆhi in small increments, the
average household is sharply reducing its consumption of these staple items. The welfare
losses implied by columns 1–3 of Table VII, then, are substantial at face value.
The money-metric measures of loss tell a similar story. In columns 4–6 of Table VII
we report summary statistics for eˆhi, Lhi, and L˜hi. (The table is sorted by decreasing values
of column 6, so that high loss items are at the top. From now on we will usually display items
in that order.) On average, losses represent 8.9% of total expenditure at the household-item
level. For a number of frequently purchased items – sardines, onions, kerosene, cooking oil,
cooking bananas, tomatoes – losses represent more than 10% of expenditure. In columns 4–6
of the lower panel of Table VII we report summary statistics for all households represented
in the upper part of the table, divided into those above/below median Lh. We calculate
household-level means by first summing adjusted expenditure (eˆh =
∑
i eˆhi) at the household
level, then averaging. We define the household-level percentage loss measure, L˜h, as L˜h =
Lh/eˆh. Not surprisingly, losses vary substantially across households. The overall household-
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Table VII: Purchase quantities and expenditures: Observed and counterfactual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ITEM-LEVEL MEANS
Quantity
Potential
quantity % change
Adjusted
expenditure Loss % Loss
Item qhi q
∗
hi Q˜hi eˆhi Lhi L˜hi
Kerosene 1.12 1.33 33.3 1730 289 19.8
Onions 1.42 1.81 46.1 522 95 19.7
Cooking Bananas 26.65 31.06 50.7 3044 496 18.4
Cooking Oil 0.99 1.19 26.4 2149 311 16.5
Tea Leaves 0.09 0.11 31.5 482 57 16.1
Sardines 1.53 1.71 28.6 903 113 13.8
Tomatoes 3.39 3.89 17.5 1244 107 11.1
Salt 1.41 1.48 7.5 671 37 6.9
Coconut 4.53 4.80 7.7 1889 115 6.8
Maize 34.12 36.12 8.3 11846 711 6.6
Sweet Bananas 1.47 1.55 6.3 1157 31 4.7
Cassava 11.73 12.14 5.6 1355 66 4.6
Soap 8.58 8.88 4.5 925 36 4.4
Charcoal 14.88 15.37 7.2 5465 56 4.2
Milling 29.89 30.56 3.0 856 22 2.8
Matches 5.44 5.56 2.5 248 5 2.2
Cigarettes 40.40 40.55 0.4 1955 14 1.2
Sugar 2.70 2.71 0.8 3212 19 1.1
Flour 8.76 8.82 0.7 4944 38 1.0
Rice 7.55 7.59 0.6 6385 43 0.9
Beans 2.81 2.81 0.5 2809 9 0.5
Tea 4.53 4.53 0.0 905 0 0.0
AVERAGE 15.6 2106 112 8.9
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL MEANS
Households eˆh Lh L˜h
All 15826 840 6.9
Below median 9290 198 4.5
Above median 22335 1480 9.3
Notes: All multi-purchasing households included; Lhi and percent change both set to zero for single-purchasing households; for
Item panel, columns 3 and 6 calculated at household-item level before averaging across items, and column 3 calculated after
throwing out upper 1% tail; for Household panel, “median” refers to median of Lh.
level average is 840 TZS, or 6.9% of expenditure. Financial losses among the above median
group represent almost 10% of total expenditure, on average.
Figure 4.2 shows histograms and kernel density estimates for the distributions of Lh
(left panel) and L˜h (right panel) among multi-purchase household-item pairs. Items with flat
price schedules are not dropped, so as not to bias the estimates toward large losses. There
is substantial between-household variation in losses. Approximately 8% of households incur
zero losses (with our conservative approach to estimation). Yet, nearly a quarter (24%) incur
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Figure III: Distribution of financial losses
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. The average exchange rate during the study
period was 1,150 TZS per US dollar.
losses above 10% of expenditure.
What drives the substantial between-household variation in financial losses? To ex-
amine whether particular types of households are more prone to forego bulk discounts, we
estimate household-level descriptive regressions of Lh and L˜h on a vector of household char-
acteristics. Results are shown in Table VIII. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates with Lh
as the dependent variable. In both columns we see that the poorest quartile of households
(the excluded category) have lower losses than the other three quarters of households, though
the differences are only weakly statistically significant. The age, gender, and education level
of the household head do not meaningfully co-move with losses. Larger households exhibit
slightly greater losses, a result we discuss further in Section 5.2.4.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table VIII report the results of the same specifications, with L˜h
as the dependent variable. Households in the first two wealth quartiles have similar mean
percentage losses, but percentage losses are slightly lower for those in the third quartile, and
substantially lower for those in the wealthiest quartile. The estimated coefficients on head
of household characteristics, in column 4, are too small in magnitude to be of importance.
While distance from the community center is statistically significantly associated with lower
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Table VIII: Loss regressed on household characteristics
Dependent variable: Loss Loss % Loss % Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) 162.752* 153.190* -0.002 -0.001
(78.307) (72.942) (0.006) (0.006)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) 153.415 140.203 -0.010** -0.010**
(107.081) (126.721) (0.004) (0.003)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 270.419* 228.306 -0.033** -0.034***
(116.184) (158.872) (0.010) (0.009)
Age of head (years) -5.320* -0.001**
(2.352) (0.000)
Head is female (=1) 29.313 0.003
(78.002) (0.005)
Head years of education -0.908 -0.001
(15.013) (0.001)
Household size 78.799* -0.004
(32.241) (0.003)
Distance to community center (km) -91.024 -0.006**
(70.775) (0.002)
Observations 1471 1465 1471 1465
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21
Mean dep. var. 840 837 0.069 0.069
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at district level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects, controls for demographic composition of the household, and controls for questionnaire module. The
wealth index is defined with quartile 1, the excluded group, as the poorest.
normalized losses, the effect is not especially meaningful given the distribution of distances
in the data (mean 0.6 kilometers, s.d. 0.7).
Perhaps the most interesting results in Table VIII are those related to wealth. When
using levels (columns 1-2), losses appear to be positively related to wealth. When using
percentages, losses are negatively related to wealth. This pattern indicates that there may
be different types of loss-prone households – wealthy households that suffer large losses in
levels but small losses as a percentage of total spending, and poor households that suffer
small losses in levels but large losses as a percentage of total spending. To investigate this
possibility, Table IX presents summary statistics for four groups of households (moving from
column 2 to column 5): (i) households in the highest quartile of Lh but not the highest
quartile of L˜h, (ii) households in the highest quartile of L˜h but not the highest quartile of
Lh, (iii) households in the highest quartile for both losses and percentage losses, and (iv)
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households that are in neither worst quartile.
Table IX: Summary statistics by loss categories, household level
Among the 25% highest loss households by...
Overall Lh only L˜h only
Both Lh
and L˜h Neither
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proportion in group 1.00 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.63
Number of transactions 37.95 79.53 23.95 49.32 30.49
Number of items purchased 10.65 14.36 8.93 12.15 9.96
Adjusted expenditure 17589 40975 6186 19299 14985
Adjusted expenditure per capita 4060 8447 2055 4311 3565
Loss (level) 825.54 1944.99 658.04 2283.98 343.85
Loss (%) 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.03
Wealth index -0.01 0.83 -0.41 -0.01 -0.10
Distance to comm. center (km) 0.61 0.36 0.57 0.53 0.67
Head age (years) 46.66 46.44 46.25 41.13 47.98
Head education (years) 4.73 5.77 3.78 5.17 4.60
Head is female (=1) 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.20
Household size 5.33 6.14 4.32 5.25 5.39
Number of children 9-14 0.91 1.14 0.65 0.87 0.92
Number of adults 15-59 2.50 3.06 1.99 2.43 2.50
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Sample includes the 1,497 households with complete
demographic data.
Groups (i) and (ii) look like the rich and poor households discussed in the previous
paragraph. The 12% of households that have high losses but not high percentage losses
(column 2) appear to be upper-class households. They make substantially more purchases,
spend more than twice as much, and buy many more items than the average household.
Their average level of the wealth index is almost a full standard deviation above the mean,
and they are larger, more educated, and live nearer to the city center. In contrast, the 12%
of households that have high percentage losses but not high level losses (column 3) appear
to be poor and disadvantaged households. These households are smaller, less educated, and
poorer in both expenditure and wealth terms.
Group (iii), the 13% of households that are in both high-loss categories (column 4),
are interesting for a different reason: they exhibit very large losses despite having close to
average expenditures. They also have near average wealth, household size, and education.
Their most notable characteristic is that the household heads are younger and more likely to
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be male, raising the interesting possibility that they lack the foresight or maturity to organize
household finances. Otherwise, there is little besides their inefficient shopping patterns that
distinguishes these households from the average.
When we investigate in Section 5 why some households forego bulk discounts, we will
often use the categorization of households from Table IX. Indeed, given how different these
three groups of loss-prone households appear to be, it seems plausible that they suffer losses
for different reasons.
4.3 Variation in price paid conditional on quantity
Although our focus is on bulk discounts and why households might not take advantage of
them, it is worth taking a moment to explore the nature of residual variation around the
expenditure schedule. As suggested in the motivating example in Section 2.2, we observe
many instances in which the price for the same quantity of the same item varies between
transactions. Because of how we construct Lh and L˜h, this price variation does not impact
our loss analysis directly. But it is interesting, nonetheless, because it represents a second
dimension of between-household variation in prices that may be responsible for the “poor
pay more” hypothesis.
In Table X we show the proportion of transactions for each item that are below, on,
and above the expenditure schedule. There is less variation than one might expect. On
average, 46% of transactions are exactly on the schedule, with 19% below and 35% above.
At the top of the table, with 74–95% of prices falling on the schedule, we find matches, tea
and cigarettes. These are highly standardized goods that are sold in clearly identifiable and
uniform units. At the bottom of the list are cooking bananas and cassava, with less than 20%
of transactions on the schedule. These goods are typically sold in imprecise units (heaps,
bunches). This suggests that some of the variation in unit price conditional on quantity may
be due to measurement error, either at the time of purchase or during data collection.
In Section 2.2 we labeled the idiosyncratic component of price, conditional on quan-
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Table X: Position of transaction expenditure relative to expenditure schedule
Below On Above
Item (1) (2) (3)
Cigarettes 0.01 0.95 0.04
Tea 0.10 0.78 0.12
Matches 0.14 0.74 0.12
Sugar 0.17 0.70 0.13
Onions 0.17 0.61 0.21
Soap 0.11 0.57 0.32
Tomatoes 0.18 0.52 0.30
Rice 0.20 0.49 0.31
Tea Leaves 0.11 0.48 0.41
Beans 0.28 0.44 0.28
Salt 0.18 0.42 0.40
Kerosene 0.26 0.39 0.36
Charcoal 0.26 0.38 0.36
Dagaa 0.13 0.35 0.52
Cooking Oil 0.20 0.35 0.46
Coconut 0.33 0.32 0.34
Sweet Bananas 0.17 0.30 0.53
Maize 0.27 0.25 0.48
Flour 0.21 0.22 0.57
Milling 0.20 0.20 0.61
Cooking Bananas 0.32 0.17 0.50
Cassava 0.47 0.12 0.41
AVERAGE 0.19 0.46 0.35
Wealth index quartile 1 0.17 0.48 0.35
Wealth index quartile 2 0.18 0.46 0.35
Wealth index quartile 3 0.20 0.47 0.33
Wealth index quartile 4 0.20 0.45 0.35
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. The wealth index is defined with
quartile 1 as the poorest. Table sorted by decreasing values of column 2.
tity, as νhik. This residual variation could reflect unobserved item quality, bargaining skill,
shopping effort, or other factors. We can calculate the empirical analog of this term as the
difference between observed and adjusted expenditure, i.e., νˆhik = ehik − eˆhik. By definition,
the 46% of transactions that take place on the expenditure schedule have νˆhik = 0. To
examine the correlates of νˆhik, we first normalize it to its percentage difference from the
expenditure schedule: νˆnhik = νˆhik/eˆhik =
ehik−eˆhik
eˆhik
, where the “n” superscript indicates “nor-
malized.” The mean of νˆnhik is 0.16, indicating that the average transaction is 0.16 standard
deviations above the expenditure schedule.8
8Recall that the focal expenditures that underlie the expenditure schedule are medians. The average
transaction lies above the schedule because there is positive skewness in expenditure conditional on quantity.
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Table XI: Regressions with idiosyncratic price component as dep. variable, transaction level
Dependent variable: νˆnhik |νˆnhik|
(1) (2)
Quantity z-score -0.029 -0.022
(0.02) (0.02)
Precise unit (=1) 0.112 0.116
(0.10) (0.10)
Market day purchase (=1) 0.013*** 0.007
(0.00) (0.01)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) -0.017 -0.011
(0.02) (0.02)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) -0.002 0.001
(0.02) (0.01)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 0.032 0.021
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 53588 53588
R-squared 0.20 0.23
Mean of dep. variable 0.16 0.24
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at district level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects, item fixed effects, and controls for questionnaire module. Sample includes 1,496 households in 168
villages in 7 districts. We dropped observations in the 1% upper and lower tails of the νˆnhik distribution
before estimation.
To examine the variation in νˆnhik, we estimate regressions of the level and absolute
value of νˆnhik on transaction and household characteristics. We use both the level and abso-
lute value as dependent variables so as to explore factors associated with higher prices and
greater spread. Table XI shows results. The variables of main interest are the wealth quar-
tile dummies and the variable “Precise unit”, which takes a value of 1 if the unit involved
in the transaction is standardized and precisely defined (at the local level), and zero oth-
erwise.9 Regressions also include district effects, item effects, questionnaire effects, controls
for quantity (via item-level z-scores), and controls for purchases on village market days.
Results are broadly similar across the two columns of Table XI. There is only one sta-
tistically significant coefficient, in column 1, indicating that average prices are conditionally
9Based on the market survey efforts of the research team, we designated the following units as precise:
kilogram, liter, 25kg bag, 50kg bag, debe, kisadolini, and packet of tea leaves. These units are associated
with standardized quantities that were measured by the research team at markets in every village. Imprecise
units include bowls, cups, pieces, heaps, and others. These were also surveyed and measured by the research
team, but they are prone to greater measurement error. Approximately 63% of transactions were recorded
in precise units.
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higher on market days by a small amount. The “Precise unit” variable is not statistically
different from zero, and has the opposite sign of that expected.10 Otherwise, the main take-
away is that the residual component of prices does not vary meaningfully with wealth. The
estimated coefficients on the wealth quartile dummy variables are neither economically nor
statistically significant. This establishes the main result for this subsection: on average,
there do not appear to be unobserved transaction characteristics that lead to poor house-
holds paying different prices from wealthy households for the same quantity of the same
item.
5 What explains the observed purchasing patterns?
We now turn to the mechanisms that might lead households to engage in financially inefficient
purchasing patterns by foregoing bulk discounts. We consider a number of possibilities, as
previewed in Section 2. We collect these mechanisms into two groups: those that we argue we
can reject (Section 5.1), and those that we think might be playing a significant role (Section
5.2).
5.1 Mechanisms that we reject
Our analysis leads us to reject the following mechanisms as reasons for the observed purchas-
ing patterns: binding liquidity constraints, storage and transport costs, ignorance of bulk
discounts, utility from frequent shopping, and maintenance of buyer-seller relationships. By
“reject” we do not mean that these mechanisms are irrelevant for all households. Rather, we
do not think these mechanisms are responsible to any substantial degree for the losses that
we identify in Section 4.
10If we exclude item fixed effects from these regressions, the “Precise unit” coefficient is negative, larger
in magnitude, and borderline statistically significant. The implication is that if measurement error matters,
the effect is not distinguishable from between-item variation in price conditional on quantity.
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5.1.1 Liquidity constraints
Perhaps the most natural explanation for the losses in our data is that people would like to
take advantage of bulk discounts, but they lack the liquidity to do so. Prior work has em-
phasized that poor households may pay higher unit prices than wealthy households because
binding liquidity constraints prevent them from taking advantage of bulk discounts.
Initial evidence against this hypothesis is in Table VIII, above. There, in column
1 we see that wealthier households, who would seem least likely to be subject to liquidity
constraints, do indeed incur losses. To dig deeper, we investigate whether poorer households
generally buy in smaller quantities than wealthier households, which would be consistent
with the liquidity constraints hypothesis. Table XII shows the average purchase quantities
for each item, by wealth quartile. Wealth quartiles are defined within districts, to match
the expenditure schedules. Items are ordered by decreasing values of average percentage
losses (from column 6, Table VII). Looking across rows of the table, it is clear that the
average quantities in the first wealth quartile are not generally smaller than those in the
fourth quartile. For two of the first four goods listed, the poorest quarter of households
buy the largest quantities, on average. Across the remaining goods there is no clear ranking
between the wealth quartiles. In combination with the finding in Table XI that the poor do
not pay higher prices than the wealthy for the same quantities, there is no evidence of the
poor paying higher prices because they cannot take advantage of bulk discounts.
The rich-vs.-poor analysis above assumes that poorer households are more likely to
be liquidity constrained. Yet it is possible that many households in the data, including
many wealthy households, are liquidity constrained. To approach the question of liquidity
constraints from a different angle, we ask the following: for how many days would a household
have to delay purchasing an item in order to buy it at the lowest available unit price (which it
could then do in perpetuity)? In other words, for how long would a household need to forego
consumption in order to overcome a liquidity constraint? Let ahi ≡ eˆhi/14 be the average
daily expenditure on item i by household h, and recall that e∗min is the minimum expenditure
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Table XII: Average quantity per transaction, by item
Wealth Quartile (1 = poorest)
Item 1 2 3 4
Kerosene 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.35
Onions 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.31
Cooking Bananas 10.95 7.59 6.99 5.82
Cooking Oil 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.24
Tea Leaves 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Sardines 0.36 0.32 0.38 0.39
Tomatoes 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.60
Salt 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.55
Coconut 0.89 0.76 0.76 0.67
Maize 10.22 11.27 9.02 11.23
Sweet Bananas 0.40 0.47 0.35 0.45
Cassava 3.50 2.79 3.15 3.23
Soap 2.05 2.22 2.18 2.41
Charcoal 2.09 2.01 2.02 2.10
Milling 8.57 8.29 7.71 10.03
Matches 1.98 1.78 1.90 2.26
Cigarettes 4.83 4.34 5.90 5.34
Sugar 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.63
Flour 1.38 1.28 1.18 1.27
Rice 1.68 1.57 1.61 1.64
Beans 0.88 0.93 0.82 0.79
Tea 0.67 0.77 0.74 0.78
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. See Table I for units. Items
ordered by decreasing values of mean L˜h, from column 6 in Table VII.
required to buy item i at the lowest focal unit price. The self-financed purchasing delay is
then dhi = e
∗
min/ahi. We calculate dhi for all household-item pairs in which the household
makes at least one transaction.11 This is a very conservative approach, because it ignores the
fact that households could also shift spending between items, and might be able to access
some credit to finance the initial bulk purchase.
In Table XIII, we report the item-level median value of dhi for all households (column
1), by wealth quartile (columns 2-5), and for the three groups of loss-prone households
(columns 6–8). The most striking feature of Table XIII is that the median delays are all
relatively short. Virtually all are less than two weeks, and the majority are less than one
week. The wealthiest households have shorter delays, but the differences are not substantial.
11Note that including household-item pairs with only one transaction will tend to make these numbers
larger because this will include someone who is just dabbling—i.e., someone who makes one small quantity
purchase will have a high value of dhi.
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Table XIII: Median days required to save enough to purchase at lowest unit price
All By wealth quartile (1 = poorest) Loss-prone HHs as measured by...
1 2 3 4
%age
only
Level
only Both
Item (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kerosene 14.0 17.8 14.0 13.7 10.1 19.9 7.8 13.4
Onions 4.7 5.6 4.7 4.7 3.5 7.0 3.2 3.9
Cooking Bananas 11.9 14.0 12.9 14.0 9.3 24.1 9.3 8.0
Cooking Oil 8.1 13.2 11.5 8.9 3.7 15.0 4.2 7.2
Tea Leaves 7.9 7.0 14.0 14.0 4.7 35.0 4.5 16.3
Sardines 4.7 3.5 3.9 4.7 7.0 5.2 4.1 4.0
Tomatoes 3.1 4.7 4.7 3.5 1.7 4.7 1.7 2.5
Salt 8.6 7.0 7.0 8.8 11.7 11.7 7.8 8.8
Coconut 3.3 2.8 3.1 2.8 3.7 11.2 3.1 5.6
Maize 7.2 7.0 9.8 8.0 12.3 17.5 4.7 8.7
Sweet Bananas 8.4 10.5 16.8 9.5 6.0 18.2 4.8 13.2
Cassava 5.3 4.7 3.1 3.5 9.8 6.1 8.1 5.7
Soap 4.7 6.2 4.0 3.5 7.0 7.0 3.5 3.5
Charcoal 2.0 14.0 7.0 3.5 1.7 12.9 1.6 3.5
Milling 5.8 5.6 4.7 7.1 12.3 7.8 4.1 7.0
Matches 7.0 7.0 7.0 12.4 7.0 14.0 7.0 7.0
Cigarettes 1.0 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.5 3.5 0.5 1.3
Sugar 2.3 3.5 2.8 2.3 1.6 4.5 1.4 2.8
Flour 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.3 2.3 3.5 1.4 2.3
Rice 2.3 3.5 3.5 3.1 1.0 7.0 1.1 4.7
Beans 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.8 4.7 1.8 3.5
Tea 3.5 7.0 3.5 4.7 2.0 7.0 2.3 3.5
OVERALL 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.3 3.5 8.8 3.4 5.4
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Items ordered by decreasing values of mean L˜h, from
Table VII. Column 6 includes households in highest quartile by L˜h but not Lh. Column 7 includes households
in highest quartile by Lh but not L˜h. Column 8 includes households in highest quartile by both.
The “Percentage-only” loss-prone households have the longest delays, with an average of
8.8 days (column 6). We have already seen in Table IX that these households appear to
be poor and disadvantaged on numerous dimensions. Hence, if liquidity constraints drive
small-quantity purchasing for anyone, these households are the most likely candidates. Yet,
even for this group, the delays are short. If liquidity constraints are the only barrier to
high-quantity purchasing, then it hardly seems onerous to delay consuming an item for a
week or two, once, in order to consume more of it at lower cost forever afterwards.
Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) conduct a similar analysis for roadside vendors in
Chennai, India (p. 123-124). Those vendors lose roughly half of their daily earnings to inter-
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est payments on short-term loans, and yet still buy a daily cup of tea. The authors calculate
that by foregoing tea for 50 days, the average vendor could save enough to permanently
avoid short-term borrowing, resulting in doubling of take-home pay (and, from then on, the
purchase of more tea in perpetuity). Here, we find far shorter delays are required to reach
the efficient purchasing path, even for the households with the highest losses. Furthermore,
the analysis in Table XIII is purely within-good. If we were to allow for subsidization across
goods, more in line with the intuition in Mullainathan and Shafir (2013), the delays would
be even shorter.
From this evidence, we conclude that liquidity constraints are not playing a major role.
This is not to say we believe liquidity constraints are irrelevant for all households. Rather,
the losses that we observe in our data do not seem to be driven by liquidity constraints.
5.1.2 Costs of transporting or storing bulk purchases
In wealthy countries, limitations on transport or storage space can be a binding constraint on
bulk purchasing (Griffith et al., 2009). A household cannot buy a carton of paper towels at a
big box store if it has no way to transport and store such a large purchase. In our data, the
situation is not so extreme. The bulk discounts in our study are available at relatively small
quantities, almost all of which can easily be transported and stored in a typical household.
To see this, compare in Table VI the distribution of q∗min (columns 2-4) with the
mean total purchase quantities across two weeks (column 1). The magnitudes in column 2
are generally far below those in column 1. Total household purchase quantities over just two
weeks typically exceed the minimum quantity needed in order to buy in bulk. In this setting,
bulk purchasing does not require the purchase and transport of an excessive quantity of any
item.
The same line of reasoning makes it very unlikely that households avoid bulk pur-
chasing because of concerns about theft or depreciation of stocks during storage. In Table
VI we see that the average household buys many multiples of the minimum quantity needed
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to access the lowest available unit price. The quantities associated with bulk purchasing are
simply too small for depreciation to be the central concern of consumers.
Finally, if transport costs were a major impediment to bulk purchasing, we would
expect households living on the outskirts of the community to have higher losses. Yet, in
columns 2 and 4 of Table VIII we see that the association between distance and loss is
negative, if significant at all. Overall, there is no evidence that the cost of transporting or
storing bulk purchases can explain the purchase quantities in the data.
5.1.3 Utility from shopping
Perhaps people make frequent, small-quantity purchases because there is a utility value
from shopping—e.g., from the socializing and community engagement that one enjoys in the
market. Given our knowledge of Tanzania, we doubt this mechanism plays much of a role
in leading people not to take advantage of bulk discounts. People can pass by shops and
markets without making purchases, and do so frequently. There is nothing to stop consumers
from visiting shops to socialize, but buying in bulk when they need to make a purchase.
The data also contradict this hypothesis. Even the households that incur the largest
losses could rearrange their purchase patterns to take greater advantage of bulk discounts
and make more purchases overall. To illustrate, define K∗hi ≡ eˆhi/e∗min. This is the coun-
terfactual number of separate transactions that household h could make on item i at the
lowest available unit price for that item. The actual number of transactions that household h
makes on item i, Khi, could be smaller or larger than K
∗
hi. For items with bulk discounts on
which the households makes frequent small purchases—in particular, purchases of quantities
smaller than q∗min—the household will have K
∗
hi < Khi. For items on which the household
typically purchases quantities larger than q∗min, the household will have K
∗
hi > Khi. For items
purchased in both small and large quantities, the ordering of K∗hi and Khi is ambiguous.
Table XIV shows the mean values of Khi, K
∗
hi, and the difference K
∗
hi − Khi for all
households and for the three groups of loss-prone households. The positive differences in
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Table XIV: Counterfactual change in number of transactions, if purchasing at lowest unit
price
(1) (2) (3)
Subgroup Statistic
Actual
(Khi)
Counter-
factual
(K∗hi) Difference
All households Mean total transactions 38.0 61.3 23.3
Mean transactions per item 3.6 5.8 2.2
Loss-prone households, level only Mean total transactions 76.8 113.0 36.2
Mean transactions per item 5.4 8.0 2.6
Loss-prone households, %age only Mean total transactions 21.0 22.8 1.8
Mean transactions per item 2.4 2.6 0.2
Loss-prone households, both Mean total transactions 47.1 51.3 4.2
Mean transactions per item 4.0 4.3 0.4
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Second group of households are in highest quartile by
Lh but not L˜h. Third group are in highest quartile by L˜h but not Lh. Fourth group are highest quartile by
both.
column 3 indicate that the average household in all four groups could shop more while only
buying in bulk. The transaction counts are consistent with what we already know about
the loss subgroups (from Table IX). Households that are loss-prone in levels (only) accrue
their high losses by shopping a lot, making 76.8 transactions on average. However, these
loss-prone households could shop substantially more while paying the lowest unit price –
36.2 more transactions on average – if they eliminated transactions both below and above
q∗min. The next group, the high percentage loss group, are relatively poor and tend to shop
very little, which is reflected in their low level of average transactions (21). Yet, even this
group could make 0.2 more transactions per item, on average, while only purchasing in bulk.
Finally, households that are in the 25% worst group in both levels and percentages could
make 51.3 instead of 47.1 transactions if their goal was to shop as much as possible while
never paying more than the lowest available unit price.
Table XIV does not show the between-item variation in K∗hij and Khi.
12 There are
some high-loss items that would have to be purchased less often by all groups (kerosene stands
out). On net, however, the potential increases in transactions for most items outweigh the
required cutbacks in others.
12See online appendix Table A.2 for the item-level breakdown underlying Table XIV.
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These counterfactual shopping patterns are unlikely to be optimal for a variety of
reasons. However, what this analysis clearly demonstrates is that the desire to shop fre-
quently cannot explain the failure to take advantage of bulk discounts, because households
could already do more of both.
5.1.4 Ignorance of bulk discounts
Is it possible that many people in Tanzania simply do not know of the available bulk dis-
counts? We are doubtful. When we conducted informal interviews with individuals in the
study area, everyone was well aware of bulk discounts for a wide range of consumption items.
Furthermore, our data suggest that many households personally experience the non-linear
prices. Column 2 of Table IV shows the results of item-level regressions of unit price on
quantity, with household fixed effects. Even within household, bulk discounts show up. The
members of households that purchase items multiple times – exactly those that are foregoing
potential consumption – are surely aware of the available discounts.
5.1.5 Investment in buyer-seller relationship
Could it be that bulk discounts are only available to consumers who have an established
relationship with a vendor? In this case, a buyer might pay higher unit prices today as
an investment in a relationship that will allow future access to better prices. Perhaps our
data reflect a point-in-time snapshot of an ongoing process in which consumers gradually
cultivate, maintain, and sometimes lose these vendor relationships? Or, relatedly, it may be
that vendors are only willing to sell some items as “loss leaders” – large quantity purchases
provided at a heavy discount – when they are combined with smaller quantity purchases
at higher unit prices. If either of these scenarios holds, then our measures of financial loss
would be incorrect, because the expenditure schedules that we estimate from the data would
not reflect a genuine set of counterfactuals.
However, the data collected by project staff members clearly contradicts this hypoth-
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esis. In their market price surveys, bulk discounts are clearly present (see columns 4 and 5
of Table IV). Yet, these staff members had no prior relationship with vendors. Clearly, con-
sumers do not need to invest in long-term relationships with sellers, nor must they combine
large and small quantity purchases, in order to receive bulk discounts.
5.2 Mechanisms consistent with the data
We next turn to mechanisms for which we find supporting evidence. These are: inattention
to the magnitude of forgone consumption, purchasing in small quantities as a form of self-
or other-control, avoidance of social taxation, and coordination costs within the household.
5.2.1 Inattention
In Section 5.1.4 we argued that ignorance of the available bulk discounts does not drive
our findings. But it consumers could still be inattentive to the magnitude of the financial
benefits (or extra consumption) from taking greater advantage of bulk discounts, and, as
a result, not react to the existence of bulk discounts. To investigate this possibility, we
exploit the fact that households face some flat and some non-flat unit price schedules. In
particular, for the average study household, roughly 56% of observed purchases are of items
with bulk discounts in local markets, and 44% are of items with flat price schedules. Using
this variation, we can assess the extent to which households react to the existence of bulk
discounts.
In order to implement this analysis across items, we use as the dependent variable
Khi, the number of transactions by household h for item i. If a household is attending to
the impact of bulk discounts, then, relative to purchase patterns for goods with flat price
schedules, the household should make fewer transactions—that is, purchase larger quantities
less frequently. In other words, we take behavior on flat price schedules as reflective of
baseline purchase patterns, and then assess the extent to which households adjust those
patterns in reaction to the financial incentives created by bulk discounts. In this analysis it
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is also important to control for other unobserved differences in the purchase patterns across
households and items. Because there is within-item and within-household variation in the
presence of bulk discounts, we can identify the key interaction terms while including both
household and item fixed effects.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table XV show the results of regressing Khi on a dummy variable
for whether the item exhibits bulk discounts (columns 3 and 4 are discussed in the next
subsection). In column 1, we see that households make fewer purchases on items with bulk
discounts. Hence, on average, households indeed seem to attend to the existence of bulk
discounts. However, column 2 investigates how this effect differs for the three categories of
loss-prone households described in Section 4.2. The message is somewhat different. The
non-loss-prone households exhibit a strong negative relationship between the number of
transactions and the existence of bulk discounts. In contrast, loss-prone households in group
(i) (in levels only) and group (ii) (in percentages only) exhibit no relationship between the
number of transactions and the existence of bulk discounts, as indicated by the F-tests listed
in the lower panel of the table. In other words, these households seem not to attend to the
existence of bulk discounts.
Finally, loss-prone households in group (iii) (in both levels and percentages) actually
make 0.947 more transactions on items with bulk discounts (seen from summing coefficients
(a) and (d) in column 2). This result is surprising, although it does explain this group’s
particularly large losses. One possible cause of this purchasing pattern would be an item-
level correlation between bulk discounts and some other characteristic that generates frequent
purchases. We discuss one possible characteristic, how tempting it is to over-consume a good,
in the next section.
Overall, we conclude from the analysis in column 2 that inattention to the financial
implications of bulk discounts is an important driver of losses in our data. The low-loss
households react to bulk discounts; the high-loss households do not. The behavior of the loss-
prone households is consistent with other recent work on the lack of salience of total prices to
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Table XV: Number of transactions and bulk discounts, household-item level
Dependent variable: number of transactions at household-item level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Bulk discounts (=1) -0.275*** -0.666*** -0.662***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
(b) Bulk discounts × Highest quarter levels only (=1) 0.455*** 0.717***
(0.15) (0.20)
(c) Bulk discounts × Highest quarter %age only (=1) 0.827*** 0.602***
(0.15) (0.18)
(d) Bulk discounts × Highest quarter, both (=1) 1.619*** 1.361***
(0.19) (0.23)
(e) Temptation good (=1) 0.822*** 0.388***
(0.06) (0.11)
(f) Temptation × Bulk (=1) 0.423***
(0.15)
(g) Temptation × Highest quarter levels only (=1) 0.952***
(0.24)
(h) Temptation × Bulk × Highest qrtr. level only (=1) -0.488
(0.38)
(i) Temptation × Highest quarter %age only (=1) -0.482**
(0.22)
(j) Temptation × Bulk × Highest qrtr. %age only (=1) 0.187
(0.33)
(k) Temptation × Highest quarter, both (=1) 0.335
(0.28)
(l) Temptation × Bulk × Highest quarter, both (=1) 0.401
(0.38)
Observations 11068 11068 11068 11068
R2 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.35
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Item fixed effects Yes Yes No No
F test p-value: (a)+(b)=0 0.13 0.76
F test p-value: (a)+(c)=0 0.24 0.70
F test p-value: (a)+(d)=0 0.00 0.00
F test p-value: (a)+(f)=0 0.06
F test p-value: (f)+(h)=0 0.85
F test p-value: (f)+(j)=0 0.04
F test p-value: (f)+(l)=0 0.02
F test p-value: (e)+(g)=0 0.00
F test p-value: (e)+(i)=0 0.62
F test p-value: (e)+(k)=0 0.00
F test p-value: (a)+(b)+(f)+(h)=0 0.97
F test p-value: (a)+(c)+(f)+(j)=0 0.04
F test p-value: (a)+(d)+(f)+(l)=0 0.00
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at household level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1.
retail consumers (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009). Of course, it is possible that inattention
combines with other factors to drive households toward small quantity purchasing. We
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consider this in Section 6.
5.2.2 Rationing consumption
Could it be that people avoid buying in bulk as a way to limit their consumption? For
instance, a sophisticated but present-biased agent would forego bulk purchasing in order
to prevent her future self from over-consuming (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin,
1999). Relatedly, the person or persons who buy food for the household may not trust
other household members to control their consumption, and so may limit stocks as a form of
rationing. In focus group discussions, we heard variations on this idea, one from a respondent
in Bukoba that can be paraphrased as follows: “We know that we need 1 kilogram of maize
flour each evening. But if we buy a 50 kilogram bag of maize, we may find that it is gone
at the end of one month, because we use too much each day. So it is better to buy smaller
amounts.”
If rationing is present, it is most likely to occur on items that are “temptation goods” –
goods which, if held in stock, are likely to be over-consumed or consumed too quickly relative
to one’s ex ante plan. Because temptation goods are culturally specific, we conducted a short
survey to rank the study items based on their degree of temptation. We invited 86 Tanzanian
field staff members from recent research projects in the country – a panel of experts on
household decision-making around economic issues – to rank each of the 21 consumer items
in the study on a five-point categorical scale from 1 (not at all tempting) to 5 (tempting
for essentially everyone who consumes the item).13 Respondents were asked to answer for a
typical household in a typical village, not to self-assess their own temptations. The survey
was conducted online in June-July 2016. We received 43 responses. We assign each item its
average score on the 5-point scale, and then refer to the top third (7 items) as the temptation
goods in the study. These are: sugar, rice, cooking oil, soap, tomatoes, cigarettes, and sweet
13We excluded the one service in the study – milling of grains – because asking people to characterize
milling as tempting or not made no sense during piloting.
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bananas.14
It is worth noting that there is very little correlation between a good having bulk
discounts and being classified as tempting. Across the 146 item-district pairs, the correla-
tion between the temptation dummy and the indicator for bulk discounts is −0.07. The
relationship is essentially unchanged if we control for district fixed effects.
We first investigate whether consumption rationing is in fact happening. As a simple
test, we ask whether people are prone to make more transactions for temptation goods,
consistent with a desire to not accumulate stocks at home. Specifically, we regress Khi on
whether an item is a temptation good while controlling for household fixed effects.15 In
column 3 of Table XV, we see that temptation seems to really matter, as households on
average make 0.82 more transanctions for a temptation good. In other words, households
indeed seem to engage in consumption rationing for temptation goods.
We next investigate whether this consumption rationing is driving losses. Specifically,
we ask whether there is more consumption rationing for the loss-prone households, which
would indicate that the impact of a good being tempting is larger for that group. We also
assess whether the relationship between transactions and the existence of bulk discounts
(as studied in Section 5.2.1) differs for temptation goods. We are interested in whether the
tendency of loss-prone households not to react to bulk discounts could in part be driven by
temptation.
Column 4 of Table 15 presents the results. As in column 2, the non-loss-prone house-
holds exhibit a strong negative relationship between the number of transactions and the
existence of bulk discounts (coefficient (a)), but note that this relationship is weaker for
temptation goods (coefficients (a)+(f)). Households with low losses are attending to bulk
discounts, but also adjusting their behavior to accommodate temptation.
14The full ranking and average scores from the temptation survey are shown in online appendix Table A.3.
15We cannot also control for item fixed effects in these regressions. However, if we exclude the tempta-
tion dummy variable and include item fixed effects, coefficient estimates are largely unchanged, indicating
that “temptingness” is not conditionally correlated with other unobserved item characteristics that explain
variation in Khi. Likewise, the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table XV are qualitatively unchanged if we
exclude item fixed effects.
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Relative to the other groups, loss-prone households in group (i) (in levels only) demon-
strate a strong relationship between temptation and the number of transactions (coefficients
(e)+(g)). At the same time, temptation does not alter the relationship between the number
of transactions and the existence of bulk discounts for this group. In particular, for both
non-temptation goods and temptation goods, this group’s purchase patterns are the same
whether or not there are bulk discounts (as seen by the fact that coefficients (a)+(b) and
coefficients (a)+(b)+(f)+(h) both sum to roughly zero). This pattern of results is consis-
tent with these households being inattentive to bulk discounts while making smaller more
frequent purchases for temptation goods. Together, this yields losses on temptation goods.
Loss-prone households in group (ii) (in percentages only) are in fact not influenced
by temptation (coefficients (e)+(i)). We know from above that these households are poor,
and shop far less than the other groups. While these households are not influenced by bulk
discounts for non-tempting goods, for tempting goods they have more transactions when
there are bulk discounts (coefficients (a)+(c)+(f)+(j)). That is, they exhibit the surprising
pattern that we saw for group (iii) in the previous subsection (in column 2).
Finally, loss-prone households in group (iii) (in both levels and percentages) are influ-
enced mildly by temptation (coefficients (e)+(k)). Moreover, they again exhibit the surpris-
ing pattern of having more transactions when there are bulk discounts (coefficients (a)+(d)),
and this pattern is even stronger for temptation goods (coefficients (a)+(d)+(f)+(l)).
Overall, these results suggest that consumption rationing might play a role in gen-
erating losses. The evidence strongly suggests that consumption rationing is occurring for
tempation goods. Moreover, the loss-prone households are inattentive to the financial con-
sequences of this consumption rationing—and for groups (ii) and (iii) bulk discounts are
associated with even more transactions for temptation goods. All that said, it is not the
case that losses are concentrated on the temptation goods. For the three loss-prone types,
losses on the temptation goods are only 38%, 33%, and 41% of total losses. Hence, con-
sumption rationing can be at most part of the story.
46
5.2.3 Social taxation
For many communities in sub-Saharan Africa, requests by family members and friends for
gifts, shared meals, or loans – to which we refer broadly as “social taxes” – are an important
part of life (Platteau, 2014). Recent experimental work has shown that participants’ will-
ingness to share windfall gains with others is related in part to the visibility of those gains,
suggesting social pressure in favor of redistribution (Goldberg, 2016; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016).
Similarly, Baland, Guirkinger and Mali (2011) show in a sample from Cameroon that nearly
1 in 5 people who take out a loan from a savings group do not technically need that loan.
These borrowers have adequate cash savings to cover the loan value, but they take out an
interest-bearing loan to send a credible signal of poverty to their friends and family, in order
to deter requests for handouts. Likewise, De Weerdt, Genicot and Mesnard (2015) show
that a transfer recipient’s perception of a donor’s wealth affects the the value of the transfer
between them, conditional on the donor’s actual wealth. This indicates that pressure from
transfer recipients is an important factor in determining patterns of social insurance and
redistribution.16
In light of this evidence, a natural hypothesis is that a household might choose not
to buy in bulk, despite financial losses, in order to avoid paying social taxes on their store of
goods. In support of this mechanism, we present evidence on three points. First, we show
that households are indeed subject to social taxes. Second, we show that the social tax rate
is higher for those who buy in bulk. Finally, we assess whether households respond to this
by reducing their purchase quantities and foregoing bulk discounts. For the final point we
rely on anecdotal evidence.
On the first point, the SHWALITA data allow us to directly observe some components
of social taxes. In addition to the purchase transactions records, diary keepers also recorded
16Because the asset in question is a stock of food that can be immediately converted to a consumption good,
our measure of social taxes could also be interpreted as a measure of consumption coinsurance (Townsend,
1994; Ligon, 1998; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Kinnan, 2011; Chandrasekhar,
Kinnan and Larreguy, 2014). We frame the issue as one of taxes because the behavior of interest is the
decision to not buy in bulk, i.e., to forego an investment.
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the item description, quantity, unit, and value of any item sold or given away from the
household stores. To estimate the household-level social tax rate, we divide the total value
of outgoing resources by the total value of incoming resources for the two-week study period.
This is not an exact proxy for the household’s social tax rate; the outgoing data include a
small number of sales, which may inflate our measure of social tax rates, and measurement
error could induce bias in either direction. Yet, to our knowledge this is the first measure of
social taxes in the literature that is based on diary records of resource flows into and out of
the household.
Table XVI: Social taxation, descriptive statistics
Category Mean s.d.
Total value outgoing (TZS) 7982 22567
outgoing: meals and snacks 3028 9526
outgoing: grains 1488 6330
outgoing: pulses and nuts 1414 7449
outgoing: starches 413 2529
outgoing: meat and dairy 260 1406
outgoing: fruits and vegetables 83 769
outgoing: other 1296 10175
Total value incoming (TZS) 72941 101056
incoming: purchases 51184 95335
incoming: own production 15322 24008
incoming: other 6435 11058
Implied social tax rate (%) 12.4 26.1
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Estimates based on all relevant
activity listed by the 1,499 diary households for all items, not just the 22 items under
consideration in the rest of the paper. Figures are the total TZS values of each out-
going or incoming transaction reported in transaction diaries for the categories listed,
aggregated to the household-category level by the authors.
Table XVI shows descriptive statistics for the components of incoming and outgoing
resources. The uppermost panel shows the value of resources outgoing in the form of sales or
gifts, divided into sub-categories. The most important sub-category is “meals and snacks”,
which accounts for 40% of outgoing resource flows. Almost all of these are described as a
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“full meal” – a guest at the household table (this level of detail not shown). The lower
part of the table shows the value of incoming resources. Because we are using these data
to characterize households rather than to study purchase behavior, we include all items in
the incoming and outgoing measures, not just the 22 items under consideration in the rest
of the paper. The mean tax rate is 12.4%, and the median is 2.9%. These descriptive data
provide evidence on the first point: social taxes plainly exist and are a common feature of
life, although there is significant heterogeneity between households in the social tax rate.
We next ask whether buying in bulk is associated with a higher social tax rate. As
a proxy for (not) buying in bulk, we use a household’s total losses Lh, where a smaller
Lh is associated with more bulk buying. For robustness, we also estimate models with
percentage losses, L˜h, as the proxy for not buying in bulk. Table XVII shows the results
of regressions of the household social tax rate on Lh or L˜h, with and without controls for
wealth, demographics, location, and human capital.17 The coefficients of interest, on Lh and
L˜h, are stable and highly statistically significant across specifications. Because losses are
decreasing in bulk purchasing, the negative signs are consistent with the proposed hypothesis:
conditional on other characteristics, households that buy in bulk pay higher social tax rates.
The magnitudes are economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in Lh (about
935 TZS for the estimation sample) is associated with a tax rate change of -2.06 percentage
points, or 17% of the mean. Likewise, a one standard deviation increase in L˜h (about 0.066)
is associated with a tax rate change of -1.46 percentage points, or 12% of the mean.
Of course, the results in Table XVII merely establish correlation, not that buying in
bulk causes households to pay higher social taxes. It is possible that the households that
pay higher social taxes for unobserved reasons buy in bulk in order to accommodate the
expected requests. However, such reverse causation would contradict the evidence discussed
above showing that social tax rates respond to changes in visible resources. Moreover,
a second key finding in Table XVII is that social tax rates do not meaningfully co-move
17Results are similar if we use a Tobit estimator to account for the roughly 35% of households with an
estimated zero tax rate. See online appendix Table A.4.
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Table XVII: Household-level social tax rate regressed on losses and household characteristics
Dependent variable: household-level social tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lh -0.0021*** -0.0022***
(0.0007) (0.0008)
L˜h -20.6654** -22.0560**
(9.0284) (9.3974)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) 1.7832 1.3782
(2.1914) (2.1465)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) 2.4235 1.8586
(2.0651) (2.0382)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 2.0468 0.7097
(2.9586) (2.8818)
Household size 0.0079 -0.1438
(0.2715) (0.2720)
Age of head (years) -0.0118 -0.0099
(0.0506) (0.0504)
Head is female (=1) 1.4034 1.3932
(1.7317) (1.7450)
Distance to center of community (km) -0.2208 -0.1607
(0.7283) (0.7189)
Observations 1472 1465 1472 1465
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at village level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects and controls for questionnaire module.
with important observable household characteristics, such as wealth, size, and location. We
find this surprising. Yet, this result lends support to the idea that social tax rates are not
exclusively determined by time invariant household characteristics, but respond to observable
resources such as the household stocks on hand.
Finally, we assess whether fear of paying social taxes might be the reason for incurring
losses by not buying in bulk. On this point we rely on anecdotal evidence from our qualitative
work. The case was stated most eloquently by someone we interviewed in the Kagera region:
“If I buy 5 kilograms of sugar, everyone will take their tea at my house.” We heard variations
on this idea from other people. Buying small quantities – or, at least, not buying very large
quantities – can be a useful way to deter requests from one’s social network. Even if goods
can be stored privately so that explicit redistributive pressure is not a problem, people may
hold internalized norms in favor of sharing that which is available, which prevents them from
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stocking too much of an item. The end result is that households incur losses on some items
for which they would otherwise pay a lower unit price.
This analysis raises the question of whether small quantity purchasing to avoid social
taxation is financially inefficient. We could attempt to answer this question by calculating the
counterfactual tax rate that households would pay if they purchased in bulk, and refining
our measure of Lh accordingly. We opted not to do this, because construction of such
estimates requires a parametric model relating social taxes to purchase quantities and other
household characteristics. If social tax rates are determined in part by unobserved household
characteristics, as they likely are, then such a model would be of little use for the out-
of-sample predictions required by the exercise. Given this inherent limitation, we prefer
to simply emphasize that foregoing bulk purchasing may be financially efficient for some
households, because it saves them from paying higher social taxes. We discuss this more
broadly in Section 6.
5.2.4 Coordination costs within the household
Finally, we examine the possibility that purchase of financially inefficient small quantities
could be driven by the challenge of coordinating purchases between household members. We
consider two types of coordination problems: the first related to the division of shopping
responsibilities between household members, and the second to the relationship between
spouses.
To implement this analysis we need a measure of shopping coordination (or lack
thereof). As a proxy for uncoordinated shopping, we use the number of days on which two
or more household members purchase the same item. This measures the key behavior of
interest, because households that do not coordinate the shopping of their members incur
losses when two or more people purchase quantities of an item that would have cost less,
total, if purchased all at once. For these tests we use data from the 500 households that
were randomly assigned to the “personal diary” treatment. Each adult in these households
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completed his or her own transaction diary, allowing us to observe which individual was
responsible for each purchase. The modal household has 2 personal diary keepers (54% of
observations); the mean number of diary keepers is 2.1, and the maximum is 7. For almost
40% of personal diary households, and for half of those with more than one diary keeper,
there is at least one instance of two or more members buying the same good on the same
day. Across all households, the mean number of days with multiple purchasers of the same
item is 1.06.
Table XVIII: Loss regressed on number of days with multiple purchasers of same item
Households: All Multi-diary All Multi-diary
Dependent variable: Loss Loss % Loss % Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of days 2+ people buy same item 67.505** 63.789** -0.001 -0.001
(28.26) (29.48) (0.00) (0.00)
Household size 42.287* 28.907 -0.001 -0.002
(21.87) (26.74) (0.00) (0.00)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) 90.348 87.828 -0.005 -0.003
(114.58) (135.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) 74.841 70.731 -0.007 -0.007
(133.06) (152.44) (0.01) (0.01)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 183.368 73.947 -0.019 -0.014
(177.12) (211.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 495 381 495 381
R2 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.16
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at village level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects. Personal diaries only.
Table XVIII shows results of regressing losses at the household level on the multiple-
purchaser variable and key control variables. Results are shown for all households in the
personal diary treatment as well as only for those households with multiple diary-keepers,
and for both level and percentage losses. In column 1 we see that the level value of losses
is increasing in the degree of un-coordinated shopping. Each additional day on which more
than one person buys the same item is associated with 68 TZS higher losses. This result
is essentially unchanged if we restrict attention to households with multiple diary-keepers
(column 2). Importantly, these results hold while conditioning on household size. We expect
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more frequent multiple-purchasing in larger households, because the costs of coordination
are increasing in the number of people to coordinate. We have already seen that losses are
conditionally increasing in household size (Table VIII).
Columns 3 and 4 report estimates of similar regressions with L˜h as the dependent
variable. Here we see that there is no link between lack of coordination and percentage losses.
This is not surprising, as we already know that households with high percentage losses tend
to be smaller and to make many fewer purchases than average (Table IX).
A second type of coordination problem was mentioned by numerous respondents
during our qualitative work. The suggestion was that husbands in Tanzania ration the
spending of their wives by giving them daily allowances to purchase necessities, such as
the components of the family meal. The husband’s goals, according to interviewees, are to
carefully guard the household finances and to prevent the wife from spending money on items
for herself. This mechanism alone would not be sufficient to generate losses, because the wife
could potentially save some cash and delay purchasing certain items in order to buy goods
in bulk. However, if such behavior would be perceived as a violation of the social contract
between spouses, the personal cost to the woman could be too high to justify saving up in
order to bulk purchase.
This model of spousal control is difficult to test, because there are many unobserved
forces that could lead to gender differences in purchasing behavior. We can, however, use
the data from personal diaries to examine whether losses are overwhelmingly attributable
to women rather than men. For many items women do buy slightly smaller quantities than
men, on average. Yet, if we treat each individual as an independent unit and calculate the
self-financed purchasing delay for each item that appears in each personal diary (as in Table
XIII), the median days to efficient purchasing are 7.9 for women and 9.3 for men. This
suggests that financial losses are not attributable to small quantity purchasing by women
alone. Thus, while we cannot rule out that husbands impose short-term spending constraints
on their wives, we do not have evidence that this leads to the accrual of losses.
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6 Discussion
The analysis in this paper has demonstrated the existence of significant bulk discounts in
Tanzanian markets, even at relatively low quantities. We have shown that some households
suffer substantial financial losses by not taking advantage of those bulk discounts. We have
further investigated a number of possible explanations for this behavior, rejecting some
mechanisms and presenting evidence in favor of others. In this section, we discuss some
broader implications of our findings, and conclude.
A clear implication of our analysis is that consumer behavior seems driven by multiple
mechanisms. Indeed, we would argue that our approach of allowing for and testing a range
of possible mechanisms yields a more complete picture of household behavior than if we
had focused on identifying one particular mechanism. Moreover, there are likely to be some
interactions between these mechanisms. Most notably, while inattention by itself can lead
to a failure to take advantage of bulk discounts, it is perhaps more important as an enabling
mechanism that “multiplies” the impact of other mechanisms. Self-rationing, avoidance of
social taxation, and coordination problems all create a clear reason to buy more frequently
and in smaller quantities. If a household attends to the impact of bulk discounts, it will
weigh the benefits of purchasing in smaller quantities against the financial cost of forgoing
bulk discounts. But inattention can render a household particularly prone to losses.
A related point is that there is no reason to believe that a single mechanism or
constellation of mechanisms should serve to explain the behavior of all households. Our
analysis clearly indicates the existence of heterogeneity in households. At one level, we see
significant heterogeneity across households in terms of losses incurred. At a second level,
even among the loss-prone households, we see different types—e.g., the households who are
in the top quartile of level losses but not in the top quartile of percentage losses appear
to be very wealthy households, whereas those who are in the top quartile of percentage
losses but not level losses appear to be very poor households. Finally, we see evidence that
households are impacted differentially by the various mechanisms—e.g., in Table 15 we see
54
that the wealthy loss-prone households seem especially influenced by temptation, while the
poor loss-prone households seem not to be influenced by temptation.
Each of the four mechanisms implicated by our analysis represents a natural response
to some constraint faced by the shopper. Inattention to bulk discounts is a natural response
to the cognitive cost of figuring out the financial implications. Limiting stocks is a natural
response to avoid inefficient over-consumption by one’s future self or by other household
members, and to the social taxes that emerge from longstanding traditions of meal-sharing
and coinsurance in village communities. And limiting purchases to avoid excessive total
household purchases is a natural response to coordination issues. Of course, the big question
is whether households are responding optimally to these other constraints. Our data do not
permit us to explicitly address this question. Yet, given the magnitude of the financial costs,
we find it hard to believe that this behavior could be fully optimal, especially for inattention.
Our finding that households in Tanzania appear to forego potential gains in con-
sumption by not buying in bulk should clearly be of interest to policymakers and consumer
advocates. Given our analysis, are there policy interventions that might make consumers
better off by helping them to take more advantage of bulk discounts? The answer depends
on the mechanism. Perhaps most promising would be interventions designed to make bulk
discounts more salient, or otherwise help households to better understand the full financial
implications of not buying in bulk. But one could also imagine interventions designed to
help people better manage their consumption of stocks, both within the household and with
neighbors, or interventions designed to better manage the coordination of household pur-
chases. Indeed, on the last point, we wonder whether the dramatic increase in cell phone use
in Tanzania since the study period may have already had a significant impact by lowering
the costs of coordination. For all such interventions, however, one must not ignore that
reductions in small-quantity purchasing could lead to negative supply-side responses and
resulting general equilibrium effects (which we cannot investigate with these data).
Finally, we conclude by reiterating our general contribution of describing and quan-
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tifying from a new angle an important feature of life in a low-income country. Spending
time in villages in Tanzania or similar countries, one cannot help but notice the frequency of
small quantity transactions at kiosks, shops, markets, and roadside stands. We examine the
financial implications of this way of making purchases, and provide evidence on numerous
hypotheses for why people might arrange their spending this way. We find strong evidence
against the ”poor pay more” hypothesis, calling into question some current wisdom about
how inequities may persist or be exacerbated by differential access to bulk discounts. We
also find a combination of external and internal forces that rationalize the observed purchas-
ing patterns. In this regard, we believe that our paper makes a novel contribution toward
understanding the micro-foundations of consumer choice in developing economies.
56
A Appendix — for online publication only
Table A.1: Regressions of expenditure on quantity and its square
Dependent variable: transaction-level expenditure
Coefficient on q2
Item
point
estimate
standard
error
Rice -1.33 (4.47)
Maize -1.22 (0.73)
Flour -22.14** (6.11)
Milling -0.06 (0.23)
Cassava 0.31 (2.98)
Cooking Bananas -2.83 (1.81)
Sugar -16.61 (8.87)
Beans -0.10 (7.51)
Coconut -14.58 (18.14)
Tomatoes -69.10 (42.87)
Onions -60.72 (51.09)
Sweet Bananas -78.50** (26.41)
Sardines -237.81*** (60.52)
Cooking Oil -407.26*** (109.55)
Salt -17.32 (33.65)
Tea -13.19** (4.53)
Tea Leaves -6806.18*** (803.50)
Charcoal -9.26** (2.68)
Kerosene -240.55*** (47.57)
Matches -1.03*** (0.18)
Soap -4.92*** (0.52)
Cigarettes -0.06 (0.03)
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses;
standard errors clustered at district level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at
0.1. Each coefficient is from a separate regression of transaction-level expenditure on
quantity and quantity squared, for only the item indicated. We report the coefficient
on quantity squared.
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Table A.2: Counterfactual change in number of transactions, if purchasing at lowest unit
price
Subgroup: 25% highest loss, level only 25% highest loss, %age only 25% highest loss, both
Item
Mean
Khi
Mean
K∗hi
Mean
diff.
Mean
Khi
Mean
K∗hi
Mean
diff.
Mean
Khi
Mean
K∗hi
Mean
diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Kerosene 5.5 1.8 -3.7 3.0 0.9 -2.1 4.7 1.3 -3.4
Onions 5.6 4.8 -0.8 2.3 2.3 0.0 4.5 4.1 -0.4
Cooking Bananas 3.0 2.2 -0.8 1.9 1.0 -0.9 3.7 2.2 -1.5
Cooking Oil 7.1 4.6 -2.6 3.2 2.0 -1.3 6.6 3.0 -3.6
Tea Leaves 5.1 4.9 -0.2 1.5 0.7 -0.8 3.5 1.5 -2.0
Sardines 3.8 5.6 1.8 3.3 3.8 0.5 4.2 5.1 0.9
Tomatoes 7.1 8.0 0.9 3.2 3.5 0.4 6.2 6.3 0.1
Salt 2.4 2.2 -0.1 1.8 1.5 -0.3 2.3 1.9 -0.4
Coconut 6.1 4.7 -1.4 2.0 1.5 -0.5 3.8 2.5 -1.3
Maize 3.2 2.7 -0.6 1.3 1.6 0.3 3.5 2.0 -1.5
Sweet Bananas 3.0 5.0 2.0 1.4 2.0 0.6 2.4 4.2 1.8
Cassava 2.3 4.4 2.1 2.0 4.5 2.6 1.9 5.1 3.2
Soap 3.9 5.9 2.0 2.3 2.8 0.5 3.3 4.9 1.6
Charcoal 7.5 9.9 2.4 3.0 1.9 -1.1 5.9 5.9 0.1
Milling 3.1 4.7 1.6 1.9 2.6 0.6 3.4 3.8 0.4
Matches 2.4 3.5 1.1 1.8 1.8 -0.0 2.3 3.3 1.0
Cigarettes 7.1 29.4 22.3 3.5 6.1 2.6 5.9 15.1 9.2
Sugar 5.6 9.9 4.3 2.0 3.6 1.6 3.7 6.0 2.3
Flour 7.4 17.3 9.9 2.5 6.4 3.9 4.1 10.7 6.6
Rice 4.8 12.0 7.2 1.4 2.7 1.4 2.9 5.2 2.3
Beans 3.2 7.7 4.5 1.4 3.5 2.1 2.5 5.0 2.5
Tea 4.9 7.3 2.4 1.8 3.1 1.3 3.8 6.4 2.6
AVERAGE 5.4 8.0 2.6 2.4 2.6 0.2 4.0 4.3 0.4
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Items ordered by decreasing values of mean L˜h, from
column 6 in Table VII.
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Table A.3: Temptation survey results (1 = Not tempting; 5 = Highly tempting)
Item
Mean
score
Tea leaves 2.31
Maize 2.33
Cassava 2.43
Kerosene 2.54
Sardines 2.74
Salt 2.79
Matches 2.81
Coconut 2.88
Cooking bananas 3.00
Onions 3.00
Flour 3.02
Beans 3.02
Prepared tea 3.15
Charcoal 3.19
Sweet bananas 3.38
Cigarettes 3.81
Soap 3.83
Tomato 3.83
Cooking oil 3.85
Rice 4.29
Sugar 4.31
Notes: Authors’ calculations from survey conducted with 43 Tan-
zanians.
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Table A.4: Household-level social tax rate regressed on losses, Tobit
Dependent variable: Estimated household-level social tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lh -0.0022** -0.0024**
(0.0011) (0.0012)
L˜h -26.7382* -25.8822*
(14.1943) (14.5389)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) 1.1341 0.6754
(2.6910) (2.6420)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) 2.5567 1.9555
(2.5476) (2.5404)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 1.4114 -0.0130
(3.8607) (3.7960)
Household size 0.4074 0.2495
(0.3631) (0.3622)
Age of head (years) -0.0464 -0.0440
(0.0725) (0.0721)
Head is female (=1) 0.5871 0.5962
(2.5705) (2.5959)
Distance to center of community (km) 0.4028 0.4775
(1.0403) (1.0360)
Observations 1472 1465 1472 1465
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at village level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects and controls for questionnaire module.
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